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Karesh: Wills and Trusts

WILLS AND TRUSTS
Coleman Karesh*
A. Appointment of Administrator
In the period under survey two cases involve the eligibility of
an applicant for appointment as administrator of an intestate
estate. In one of them, In re Greenfield's Estate,1 application for
letters of administration was filed by the alleged widow of the
intestate. The petition was resisted by members of the decedent's
family on the ground that the applicant was not the decedent's
lawful wife. The judge of probate issued letters to the applicant
on a finding that she was the lawful wife of the intestate. The
circuit court affirmed, and it in turn was affirmed by the South
Carolina Supreme Court. The case does not involve any particular principle of the law of administration, but it is interesting,
and important, as it deals with the facts and the applicable legal
principles which impelled the three courts to conclude that a
common-law marriage existed. Its significance lies almost entirely in the field of family law.
In the case of In re McOlam's Estate,2 the novel question was
presented whether the committee of an intestate, otherwise entitled to appointment as in a preferred class, was eligible, in
view of his committeeship, to become administrator. The applicant for letters of administration was one of several brothers and
sisters of the decedent and was acting as her duly appointed
committee at the time of her death. The application was resisted
by some of the brothers and sisters. The judge of probate overrode their objections and appointed the applicant administrator.
On appeal, the circuit court reversed, vacated the appointment,
and designated a bank administrator.
The circuit court's view was that the applicant was disqualified
to become administrator of his sister's estate because, without
regard to his character or competency, he would be,
required to account to the personal representative of the
estate, and to turn over to the personal representative . . .
the assets of her estate. He will be called on to make an accounting for his acts and doings with reference to her estate,
and this presents a conflict of interests, and is a sound
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.

1. 245 S.C. 595, 141 S.E.2d 916 (1965).
2. 245 S.C. 315, 140 S.E.2d 478 (1965).
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reason why he should not be appointed as her administrator
...

. His disqualification to act arises out of his relation-

ship to the business and affairs of the intestate which he
conducted as her committee.
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court,
using the same authorities as those relied upon by the latter, but
it held that the appointment of the bank as administrator was
premature and improper, in that the other brothers and sisters
were, in the order of statutory preference, 4 entitled to consideration for possible appointment ahead of the bank.
The South Carolina precedents relied upon by the circuit court
and by the supreme court clearly take the position that the right
to letters of administration is not automatic and absolute merely
because the applicant is in a preferred order, and that an applicant otherwise entitled to appointment by virtue of priority or
equality may be rejected on the basis of facts showing him to be
unfit or unsuitable for the office.5 Principal reliance was had
upon E w parte Tolbert" (where the applicant for letters, brother
of the decedent, was a surviving partner) in which this language
was used:
One may, however, be disqualified to act as administrator
for some good reason arising out of his relation to the business and affairs of the intestate. This principle was recognized in the case of Rowell v. Adams7 . . . where it was
stated that a surviving partner of a decedent as a general
rule could not be appointed administrator of the estate, nor
ought one interested against the heirs or the estate be appointed .

. .

. [I]t is apparent that the appellant will be

called on to make an accounting for his acts and doings with
reference to the estate of his deceased brother, and this conflict of interests is a sound reason why he should be held
disqualified to act as administrator.8
It is to be noted that the concluding language is virtually the
same as that used by the circuit court in stating the reason for
3. Id. at 318, 140 S.E.2d at 479.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-403 (1962).
5. Ex parte Tolbert, 206 S.C. 300, 34 S.E.2d 49 (1945) ; Rowell v. Adams,

83 S.C. 124, 65 S.E. 207 (1909) ; Ex parte Small, 69 S.C. 43, 48 S.E. 40 (1904)
(in which the widow was denied letters of administration because of unfitness
and partiality).

6. 206 S.C. 300, 34 S.E.2d 49 (1945).
7. 83 S.C. 124, 65 S.E. 207 (1909).
8. Ex parte Tolbert, 206 S.C. 300, 305, 34 S.E.2d 49, 51 (1945).
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disqualification; but there is also the reference in Tobert to interests adverse to the heirs or estate, which perhaps may be
regarded as stating an inclusive general principle embracing
conflict of interest. It was this element of accountability by a
fiduciary acting in a dual capacity that prompted the court in
the present case to follow the precedent of the partnership cases.
The binding authority of the partnership cases can hardly be
questioned now, but elsewhere there is no consensus that a surviving partner is not eligible for appointment as administrator.9
Despite the common element of accountability in the partnership cases and in a case like the present, the analogy to the
unsuitable surviving partner upon which the decision here rested
is not, it may be urged, an altogether fitting one, since, although
the surviving partner owes fiduciary duties and accountability
to the estate of the deceased partner, he also has an individual
interest as partner which may produce a conflict of interest between personal claims and fiduciary obligations. With the committee-administrator, who acts in capacities which are official
and by appointment, there is no conflict of private and official
claims and rights.
It is arguable that a guardian or committee is not, by the mere
fact of his office, placed in a position of conflict of interest, nor
that he has such an adverse interest as should render him incompetent to act as administrator. At least he is in no more such
adverse or conflicting position than others who are allowed to
9. See, 21 Am. Jtp. Ez'r & Adm'r § 93 (1939): "Generally, the courts do
not regard one whose personal interests are so adverse to the interests of a
decedent's estate and of those entitled to its distribution that both cannot be
fairly represented by the same person as a proper person to administer the
estate. For this reason it has been decided that the surviving partner of an
intestate ought not to be appointed administrator of the estate of such intestate."
On the other hand, see 68 C.J.S. Partnership,§ 286 (1950) : "Unless prohibited
by statute the survivor may act as representative of the deceased partner, in
which case lie acts in a dual capacity, and his duties and liabilities for liquidation
of the firm are unaffected."
The truth of the matter is that the notion that a surviving partner may not
act as administrator-as far as states other than South Carolina are concerned
-is based almost entirely upon statutes which make him ineligible to administer,
and not because of any non-statutory principle based on the incompatibility of
holding two offices, although such incompatibility, if there is any, may have
led to the enactment of the statutes. Such statutes exist in Arizona, California
(if application is objected to), Idaho, Montana, Nevada (if application is objected to), and Utah. There may be others. In Alaska, the surviving partner
may act if he has the qualifications of a general administrator. The North
Dakota statute specifically provides that he may act. In a case from Illinois,
Howard v. Slagle, 52 Ill. 336 (1869), although it seems not directly in issue,
appointment of a surviving partner as administrator was criticized by the
supreme court, which said that the appointment should not have been made in.
view of the fact that the surviving partner would have to account to himself.
But notice the Illinois statute mentioned in note 15, infra.
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assume the office of administrator. The fact that as guardian or
committee he would be compelled to account to himself as administrator-if indeed it is technically possible for one to account to one's self-and to surrender to himself in the latter
capacity the assets of his ward's estate, 10 does not shut off his
ultimate accountability to the beneficiaries, nor to the judge of
probate, who may compel the production of, and must examine,
his accounts. It may be suggested that where one serves in several
dependent or successive relationships, the true accounting is not
by himself to himself, but to those whose interests he represents.
Moreover, in terms of practicality, so far as the committee-administrator is concerned, his obligation of faithful and proper
performance is secured by his bond, which he must separately
furnish in both capacities.
In comparing the seeming conflict of interest between guardian
(or committee) and administrator with other relationships involved in the administration of estates, it may be pointed out
that there are other apparently adverse and conflicting interests
which are sanctioned and which tend to dilute the assumption
that a conflict of interests is an inevitable ground for disqualification. One of several heirs who has been appointed administrator must occupy a position, in relation to the other heirs, as
adverse as, if not more so than, that occupied by a person holding
two representative positions. And, in the statute itself prescribing the order of priority of appointment, creditors may be appointed to the officen-and their interests can be hardly re10. The personal assets would probably pass to him by operation of law.
Burnside v. Robertson, 28 S.C. 583, 6 S.E. 843 (1888) ; Coleman v. Smith, 14
S.C. 511 (1880) ; Ex parte Witherspoon, 3 Rich. Eq. 13 (S.C. 1850). These
are cases in which an administrator was appointed guardian of an infant
distributee.
11. He is included in the least preferred category. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19403(6): "In default of such to the greatest creditor or creditors or such other
person as the court shall appoint." Obviously if he falls within the preceding
five favored categories mentioning distributees, he would not be disqualified by
reason of his being a creditor. (But see, WOERNER, ADwINISTRATION § 242
(3d ed. 1923) where applicant is to be selected from members of class, he should
not be appointed in preference to other applicants in class where he is both
next of kin and creditor.) If a distributee-creditor were appointed administrator, there would be double accountability to himself-as distributee and as
creditor.
Nor is a debtor, who perforce has an adverse interest, perhaps greater than
that of a creditor, ineligible for appointment on that account. Annot., 18 A.L.R.
2d 633 (1951). Though the issue of eligibility in this respect has not been
raised in this state, there are many cases in which there is the fact that a debtor
has been appointed administrator, just as there are cases in which a debtor has
been named executor. E.g., Donnan v. Watts, 22 S.C. 430 (1884); Twitty v.
Houser, 7 S.C. 153 (1875); Clowney v. Cathcart, 2 S.C. 395 (1870) ; Schnell
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garded as anything other than adverse; although it must be
admitted that if the legislature specifically permits creditors or
others to act, there is no obstacle to their doing so regardless of
inherent conflict of interest. In fact, the whole order of priority
of appointment is based upon the conception of the largest beneficial or individual interest, and it is only in the rarer case that
a person or institution completely disinterested is appointed.
Granted that considerations of fitness and suitability, and
particularly of adverse interest, fade in the nomination of an
executor-as distinguished from the appointment of an administrator-one of the most common examples of a fiduciary's occupying two offices, in one of which he must account to himself
in the other (if that is technically possible) is the testamentary
appointment of the same person as executor and trustee. As
executor he receives the personal estate, and as such he transmits
to himself, either directly or by operation of law, 12 the residue
of the personal estate constituting the trust assets. If the committee-adminstrator affords an instance of conflict of interest
or adverse interest, then the executor-trustee must also afford it;
yet there seems never to have been a prevailing impression,
judicial or otherwise, that the executor-trustee is tinged with
disabling adverseness or conflict of interest.
There are clearly many cases, which require no citation of
authority, presenting the aspect of the same person acting in
several fiduciary capacities or acting in a fiduciary and in an
individual capacity, and which are obviously inconsistent with
any notion that he cannot later act as a fiduciary on that account. The executor-trustee has already been noted. In terms of
accounting, the fact that there is a requirement of accounting
to one's self-if, again, that technically is possible-does not
seem to have evoked a rule that that possibility forbids one to
occupy those respective positions. The creditor who has been
appointed administrator must seemingly account in his representative capacity to himself as an individual. Similarly the heir
who has been named administrator must seemingly account as
representative to himself individually. If the matter is carried
to its logical conclusion-that supposed accountability to one's
self is a disqualifying conflict of interest-a temporary adminv. Schroder, Bailey's Eq. 335 (S.C. 1831). The dilemma that he cannot sue
himself, nor combine in himself the dual character of creditor and debtor, is
resolved, to a degree, by the fiction that he has paid himself and must account
as if he had actually received the funds. See the cases just cited.

12. See Anderson v. Earle, 9 S.C. 460 (1877).
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istrator should not be appointed permanent administrator; nor
should ancillary letters be granted to a domiciliary representative.' 8
The denial to a guardian or committee to act as administrator,
as affirmed by the court in this case, on the ground that the two
relationships produce a conflict of interest, appears not to have
any clear precedent in this country except, perhaps, for one
case 14 in which it was held that letters of administration should
not be denied an applying guardian who had long before settled
his accounts. This can hardly be a holding, nor did the court
there say that it was, that the fact of guardianship alone disqualifies the guardian to act as administrator. It may be of some significance that although in all of the states there are, in the eligibility statutes, negative provisions of one sort or anotherstating who are not qualified for appointment-none of the
statutes appears to contain an express prohibition against the
appointment of a guardian, conservator or committee of a deceased ward to administer the ward's estate. On the contrary,
several states either impose the duty upon or permit the guardian, conservator or committee to administer the deceased ward's
estate, some as a separate administration and others as a continuation of administration, although the representative may not
otherwise be in a preferred class.' 5
13. The same person may act in both capacities. Hamilton v. Levy, 41 S.C.
374, 19 S.E. 610 (1894).
14. Ballou v. Ballon, 30 R.I. 331, 75 Atl. 97 (1910).
15. In Georgia the guardian or committee is specifically authorized to distribute the deceased ward's estate as if he had been appointed administrator.
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-316 to -618 (1937). In Colorado the conservator is permitted to continue administration of the deceased ward's estate. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 152-9-12 (1953). In Illinois the guardian or conservator of a
deceased ward has powers of an administrator to collect, and within thirty days
or such further time as the court may allow after ward's death, he may be
granted letters of administration unless petition for letters has been filed and
granted. ILL. ANN. STAT. § 3322 (Smith-Hurd 1961). In Oklahoma, when
a ward dies intestate leaving personal property, and the total estate does not
exceed $3000, the guardian can proceed with liquidation of the estate as if he
had been appointed administrator. OYLA. STAT. § 58-95 (1961).
The Model Probate Code follows substantially the Illinois statute. MODEL
PROBATE CODE § 234 (1946) and note thereto, pp. 616-624, listing other states.
The list has not been updated, and it may be that it has been either lengthened
or shortened.
While these statutes, in the main, provide for a continuation of administration rather than a succeeding separate administration, neither they nor other
statutes carry an implication that the guardian cannot, if the decedent's estate
is separately administered, be appointed administrator.
As to guardian acting in another capacity, see 39 C.J.S. Guardian & Ward
§ 196 (1944). As to executor or administrator acting in another capacity, see
34 CJ.S. Ex'r & Adm'r §§ 832, 955 (1942).
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Looking at the matter broadly, the question may nonetheless
be asked: Should the fact of the supposed accountability of a
committee or guardian to himself as administrator, without regard to other facts, be a solid objection to his appointment as
administrator? He is generally the one most familiar with the
business and property of his ward; after all, he represents the
ward alive: why should he not be allowed to represent him dead?
Although the opinion in the present case does not disclose it,
the record shows that the real and underlying reason for the
resistance to the committee's petition for appointment was dissatisfaction with his handling of his ward's estate. The parties'
contentions have all the color of a family dispute not only as to
the ward's estate but as to another estate in which they were
all interested. The antagonism of the concerned persons presents
a case of conflict between parties if not, or perhaps in addition
to, a theoretical conflict of interest. The actual conflict, an actual
adverseness of interest, might well justify the result in this case,
especially when coupled with a duty to account.
At any rate, MeOlam has established the clear precedent that
the committee of a deceased incompetent-and, inferentially, the
guardian of a deceased minor-is ineligible for appointment as
administrator.16 To what extent the case will be accepted as
precedent elsewhere remains to be seen.
16. There are probably many cases, appealed and unappealed, in which a
person who might be disqualified for conflict of interest has been appointed in

the absence of objection. See Gee v. Humphries, 49 S.C. 253, 27 S.E. 101

(1896) (surviving partner). There are probably many cases also in which appointment was made of a person already owing a representative duty to the
estate which he was further appointed to represent. See Cauthen v. Cauthen,
70 S.C. 167, 49 S.E. 321 (1904) (committee appointed administrator) ; Ex parte
Witherspoon, supra note 10 (administrator of estate of which minor was distributee appointed guardian). The administrator appointed guardian of an in-

fant distributee appears frequently in cases involving liability of sureties for the
respective administrations. Burnside v. Robertson, supra note 10; Todd v.
Davenport, 22 S.C. 147 (1884); Coleman v. Smith, supra note 10; O'Neall v.
Herbert, Dudley's Eq. 30 (S.C. 1837). The statute itself prescribes that letters
of administration shall be granted, in the absence of or non-application by a
surviving spouse, to the "legal representatives" of a child or children of the
intestate. S.C. CODE AN. § 19-403(2) (1962). Ex parte Frierson, 96 S.C. 34,
79 S.E. 791 (1913) (in which such an appointment was made of a guardian).
It is obvious that in a case like this-as in others-the administrator would
have to account to himself as guardian. See Annot., 135 A.L.R. 585 (1941).
Whether the probate judge has the power or the duty, on his own motion, to
deny administration without regard to whether objection is made in cases of
disqualification, such as surviving partner, or now, guardian or committee, is a
matter of some uncertainty. Since an administrator is a deputy of the probate
judge, it would seem logical that the probate judge has the power, if not the
duty, to withhold letters even if there is no objection to the petition for appointment. The writer is informed by the judge of probate for Richland County
that following the holding in McClam he has refused letters of administration
to an applying committee, even though there was no opposition.
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B. Recovery of Assets by Representative
The question whether a probate court has power to compel,
at the instance of the personal representative of a decedent, the
discovery and surrender of assets is presented in Greenfield V.
Greenfield.17 The plaintiff, temporary administratrix of her
deceased husband's estate, brought suit in the probate court,
alleging that the defendants, brothers and a sister of the decedent, had taken possession of and assumed control of many,
undescribed books, papers, records, personal effects and other
property of the intestate, and that they had refused to surrender
them to her. She asked the probate court to compel the defendants to disclose and surrender the withheld property, and for an
order restraining their disposition. The probate court granted
the petition over the objection of the defendants that it had no
jurisdiction to grant such relief. Its view was that the statutes
relating to the jurisdiction of probate courts were extensive
enough to confer the power to take the sought-for action.
On appeal the circuit court reversed, stating that the issue
raised was whether "Probate Courts have jurisdiction to determine ownership and/or possession and order its transfer by
summary proceeding,"' 8 and it held that those courts had no
such jurisdiction.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the circuit court,
stating that in the first place the circuit court had misconceived
the nature of the issue, since, as the record disclosed, the defendants admitted that they had certain property of the deceased
and they alleged no title in themselves. The supreme court declared that the primary question was,
Whether the probate court has the jurisdiction and power
to compel relatives of a decedent to surrender the records of
the decedent, which are essential to the administration of
the estate, said relatives asserting no facts which would entitle them to the possession thereof. Stated inversely, the
issue is, can such relatives, without any claim of title or the
assertion of facts which would entitle them to the possession
of such records, thwart or indefinitely delay the adminis17. 245 S.C. 604, 141 S.E.2d 920 (1965). The case is a companion to It re

Greenfield's Estate, 245 S.C. 595, 141 S.E.2d 196 (1965), heretofore discussed
under Section A, Appointment of Administrator. The plaintiff in the present

case was suing as temporary administratrix; in the other case she was held
entitled, after her temporary appointment, to permanent letters of administration.
18. Greenfield v. Greenfield, 245 S.C. 604, 607, 141 S.E.2d 920, 922 (1965).
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tration of the estate by withholding such records and compelling the administratrix to go into a court other than the
probate court in a claim and delivery action, or possibly a
series of such actions in various counties, to gain possession
thereof. 19
The initial observation by the court on the powers of probate
courts in this state was that they are courts of limited jurisdiction and have only such powers as are conferred upon them by
statute-either in express terms or necessarily incident to the
execution of powers expressly granted. The inquiry, therefore,
was whether existent statutes either expressly or by necessary
implication granted probate courts authority to issue such orders
as that issued here-namely, in substance, to compel a disclosure
and delivery of personal property of the estate to an administrator by those having possession but having no title nor asserting a title or individual right of possession.
The supreme court concluded that two statutes-one which it
said carried the power by implication and the other which expressly granted it-justified the action that the probate court
had taken. Looking into the history of the probate courts, the
supreme court pointed first to the fact that the constitution of
1868 (article IV, section 20) had called for the formation of
probate courts, which were to have jurisdiction, among other
things, "in all matters . . . of administration." 20 Further, the

court noted the repetition of this quoted provision in the constitution of 1895 (article V, section 19)

)21

and the statute follow-

19. Id. at 609, 141 S.E.2d at 923.
20. S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 20 (1868) as quoted in Greenfield v. Greenfield,
245 S.C. 604, 609, 141 S.E.2d 920, 923 (1965).
21. The S.C. CoNsT. (1868) provided that "A Court of Probate shall be
established in each County, with jurisdiction in all matters testamentary and of
administration, in business appertaining to minors, and the allotment of dower,
in cases of lunacy and persons non compotes inentis." In another sectionS.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1868)-the constitution included probate courts as
among the courts invested by it with judicial power. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 1
(1895), declared the judicial power but did not include probate courts as did the
earlier constitution,, but, after directing the establishment of circuit courts,
provided that the "General Assembly may also establish County Courts, Municipal Courts, and such courts in any and all the Counties of this State as may be
necessary." It also provided-S.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 19 (1895) : "The Court of
Probate shall remain as now established in the County of Charleston. In all
other Counties of the State jurisdiction in all matters testamentary and of
administration, in business appertaining to minors, and the allotment of dower,
and persons non compos mentis, shall be vested as the General Assembly may
provide, and until such jurisdiction shall remain in the Court of Probate as
now established." It is to be noted that it was not provided, as in the earlier
constitution, that probate courts should be established; and it has been held,
accordingly, that, except for the Charleston court, probate courts are not consti-
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ing the mandate of the constitution, which used this same
22
language.
As to the scope and meaning of the term "all matters of administration", the court looked to the case of McNamee v. Waterbury,2 decided shortly after adoption of the constitution of 1868.
There it was determined that probate courts had power, by implication from the quoted language, to order sale of real estate
in aid of assets. (It dealt with no other factual situation, and
it made no reference, among possible powers, to the power involved in this suit.) Among the statements in that case quoted
by the court in Greenfield, appears the following, which apparently weighed heavily in forcing the conclusion that by necessary
implication the controversial power existed:
Jurisdiction, in matters of administration means power
to do what a court ought to do in the matter of administration.
The Constitution furnishes a Court on which the administrator may lean, and which can supplement his legal powers by its process ....
The expression "all" imports an intent to clothe the Probate Court with full powers in matters of administration.
That it was the intention of the Constitution to clothe that
Court with full efficiency as it regards matters of administration, is evident from the nature of the Court, as established by Sections 1 and 20, Article IV, of the Constitution.24
tutional courts and have only such powers as the general assembly may provide.
Bradford v. Richardson, 111 S.C. 215, 97 S.E. 58 (1918). The relevant section
of the 1895 Constitution was amended in the general elections of 1964, followed
by ratification by the general assembly in its 1965 session. S.C. Acts & J. REs.
1965, p. 52. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 19, (1895), now provides: "Jurisdiction in
matters testamentary and of administration, in matters appertaining to minors
and to persons mentally incompetent, shall be vested as the General Assembly
may provide; and until such provision such jurisdiction shall remain as now
provided by law." Quacre, whether the omission of "all" before matters
"testamentary and of administration" is of significance in view of the stress
placed upon "all" in McNamee v. Waterbury, 4 S.C. 156 (1873), see note 23
infra and accompanying text.
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-444 (1962). In full it reads: 'Every judge of probate, in his county, shall have jurisdiction in all matters testamentary and of
administration, in business appertaining to minors, in the allotment of dower,
and in cases of mental incompetency." The statute will probably undergo a
change by elimination of the provision as to dower in the light of the recent
change in the constitution of 1895 mentioned in the last note. Will it, or must
it, also undergo a change with respect to "all" to conform to the new language
of the constitution?" See note 21 mepra.
23. 4 S.C. 156 (1873).
24. McNamee v. Waterbury, 4 S.C. 156, 165 (1873), as quoted in Greenfield v.
Greenfield, 245 S.C. 604, 611, 141 S.E2d 920, 924 (1965).
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In the present case the court observed that "without the books,
papers or records of the decedent, neither the administratrix nor
the probate court could proceed effectively with the matters of
administration," and it concluded, "under the circumstances we
think it clear that the probate court had the power to order such
delivered by intermeddlers who had no title or right thereto.
This power, we think, is one which is of necessity incident to
the jurisdiction expressly granted the probate court over all
matters of administration." 25 The court went on to state the particular applicability to the facts of this case: "To hold that under
such circumstances the probate court cannot proceed and that
the administratrix is required to first go into some court through
a claim and delivery proceeding, as contended by defendant,
would render the probate court ineffective to exercise the jurisdiction expressly granted it. Such a holding would completely
26
defeat the administration of the estate.1

The holding that the futility or inconvenience of resorting to
one or more claim and delivery actions is reason for proceeding
in the probate court offers the unusual feature of a probate
court acting because of the absence of an adequate remedy at
law-thus turning that court into a sort of special court of
equity, the general powers of which it does not have.2 ' In view
of the possibly unsatisfactory and bothersome nature of the
claim and delivery actions, the nature of the property (particularly books and records), its identity, and its value, a relevant
inquiry at this point might be whether equity would have been
a proper forum for obtaining discovery and delivery of the property,28 and if that were so, whether any justification existed for
25. Greenfield v. Greenfield, 245 S.C. 604, 611, 141 S.E.2d 920, 924 (1965).
26. Ibid.
27. Mack v. Stanley, 190 S.C. 300, 2 S.E2d 292 (1939)-holding that a

probate court was without power to authorize an executor to mortgage land,

as being a distinct ground of equitable relief "not included in the general grant
of jurisdiction."
28. For the proposition that equity will entertain a suit for the delivery of
unique personal property wrongfully withheld, see Hull v. James, 1 S.C. 186
(1869)-holding that specific performance of contract will not lie with respect
to ordinary chattels, but will lie for articles having no ascertainable or market
value, and delivery will be compelled where the value is "neither intrinsic or
commercial but merely representative, as in the case of deeds or other evidences
of right."; Snoddy v. Finch, 9 Rich. Eq. 355 (S.C. 1857)-holding that equity
will decree delivery of title deeds wrongfully withheld, although an action for
trover or detinue would lie; Young v. Burton, McMul. Eq. 255 (S.C. 1844)same as to slaves; Wamburzee v. Kennedy, 4 DeSaus. Eq. 474 (S.C. 1814).
It would seem, too, that equity, in a proper case, could entertain a suit for discovery and relief. 30 C.J.S. Equity § 29 (1965). See Floyd v. White, Dudley's
Eq. 40 (S.C. 1837) ; Wamburzee v. Kennedy, supra. Quacre, whether sections
26-501, et seq., of the South Carolina Code, relating to discovery, would preclude this. Of course, these sections would be qualified and inapplicable if other
statutes specifically, or by implication, permitted discovery.
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proceeding in the probate court. A relevant inquiry also would
be whether, narrowing the matter to one of administration of
estates, equity would order discovery and restoration of assets
on the plea of the representative-the indication generally being
that it would.2 9 Admittedly, however, even if process at law or
in equity were available for discovery and restitution of assets,
the statutory right to move in the probate court would, in itself,
justify the use of that right, particularly if it were less cumbersome and time-consuming than the processes of the law and
equity courts.Y° The jurisdiction of the latter courts is, in many
cases, concurrent with that of the probate court, and McNamee
v. WVaterbury,3 1 already mentioned, is authority enough for the
proposition that-the fact that an equitable remedy exists does
not preclude probate court action, since, although the court there
held that the probate court may order land sold in aid of assets,
equity both before and after that decision has had similar authority. But the point to all this is that the rationale, concluding
that there must be read into the words "all matters of administration" a right to discovery and delivery of assets because of insufficiency and inadequacy of proceedings elsewhere, does not
seem wholly justified.
It appears to be fairly well established throughout the country
that, in order to obtain discovery, or discovery and return of
assets, or simply return of assets, or recovery of their value, the
action must be brought in courts of law or equity, and that in
order for probate courts to entertain such proceedings, summary
in their nature, statutory sanction must be given.82 From their
very nature in their historical setting, probate courts have had
powers relating to the probate of wills and the administration
of estates. In creating or recognizing such courts, by whatever
29. See Floyd v. White mipra note 28; 33 C.J.S. Ex'r & Adm'r § 153 (1942) ;
21 Am. JR. Ex'r & Advt'r § 905 (1939); ScHouLER, WILLS, ExECUTOPS & ADMINISTr.ATORS

§§ 2181-82 (6th ed. 1923).

30. As to time, this is at least in one respect debatable. In terms of ultimate
appeal to the state supreme court, proceedings originating in the circuit court
would entail only one appeal; proceedings in the probate court would necessitate
two appeals: one to the circuit court and a second from that court to the

supreme court. That was the case here.
31. 4 S.C. 156 (1873).
32. 33 C.J.S. Ex'r & Adm'r § 153 (1942); 21 Am. JuTR. Ex'r & Adm'r § 906
(1939); ATIaNSON, WILLS § 117 (2d ed. 1953); MODEL PROBATE CODE § 130

1946) and note, and statutory note at p. 321-listing states which authorize
probate court disclosure proceedings, some being limited to disclosure, others
in addition requiring surrender of property or determination of title. South
Carolina is not included in the list. All statutes appear to be specific and to
the point; none are given as impliedly authorizing.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss1/21

12

1966]

Wills
and Trusts
WILLS AND Karesh:
TRUSTS
SURVEYED

name, the various legislatures have undoubtedly conferred general powers in the customary sense; yet, it has been deemed necessary to enact special statutes to permit summary proceedings
of the kind involved to be had in the probate courts. The South
33
Carolina Constitution of 1868, which is reflected in the statute,
naturally did not simply pronounce the establishment of probate courts and stop there; it reasonably added "in all matters
testamentary and of administration.' In fact, it was virtually
imperative that these words should follow, since there was also
added jurisdiction which the predecessor courts of Ordinary did
not have-allotment of dower and supervision of the persons
34
and estates of persons of unsound mind.
As stated earlier, the court in this case found additional reason
for upholding the claim of the administratrix in a statute which
it construed as expressly giving her the right to seek the relief
which she asked. An oddity in the case is that the statute so
relied on was not made the basis of consideration or decision on
either the probate court or circuit court level, but appeared for
the first time in the exceptions to the decree of the circuit court
reversing the probate court. The statute is an old one, enacted
in 1839, 5 and since then it has reappeared in all the general and
revised statutes, and in all the codes, including the present one.
Because of the crucial character of the present statute, it is set
out in full:
The judge of probate of the county in which a deceased
person may have died may, either of his own accord or at the
instance of any creditor or other person interested in the
estate of the deceased cite before him such person as neither
being appointed executor nor having obtained administration of the effects of such deceased person, shall nevertheless
possess himself of the goods, chattels, rights and credits of
such person deceased and, upon such person being cited as
aforesaid, the judge of probate shall require of him a discovery and account of all and singular the goods, chattels,
rights and credits of the deceased and shall proceed to decree
33. S.C.

CODE ANN. § 15-444 (1962).
34. As to persons of unsound mind, see Walker v. Russell, 10 S.C. 82 (1877);
Ex Parte Richards, 2 Brevard 375 (S.C. 1810); as to dower, Stewart v.
Blease, 4 S.C. 37 (1872) As to minors, the court of Ordinary seems to have
had power to name guardians without specific statutes authorizing. Howard v.

Faber, 2 McCord's Eq. 446 (S.C. 1827).

35. See 11 Stat. 63. This act was borrowed from an earlier statute, 5 Stat.

112 (1789).
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against him for the value of the estate and effects of the
deceased which he may have wasted or which he may have
been lost by his illegal interference, charging him as executors of their own wrong are made liable at common law, as
far as assets shall have come into his hands.8 6
The statute appears to have been mentioned in only a few
cases, and in only two of them is the central issue of the applicability of the statute raised. In one, Haley v. Thomas,3 7 distributees of an intestate brought action in the probate court
against other distributees in possession of estate assets, asking
for discovery and account under the statute. The court held,
however, that the statute could be invoked only if administration had been obtained. There is a fairly clear inference that the
probate court could, in a proper case, order not only a discovery
but also a delivery of assets. In the second case, Ex parte
Davega,38 action was brought in the probate court by an administrator against a mortgagee of the intestate's chattels, who had
sold the property and applied the surplus after sale to the payment of debts of the decedent. The basic question was whether
the defendant was an executor de son tort, but the probate court
decreed not only a discovery and accounting but also a delivery
of the remaining funds to the administrator. This course was
approved by the supreme court, reversing the circuit court. On
neither the circuit court level nor above was any direct issue
made as to the power of the probate court to compel a delivery.
The issue of delivery became an important one in the present
case because the defendants argued that the word "account" did
not mean "deliver" or a like term. The court construed "account"
as meaning delivery, concluding that the language of the statute
is clear and reflects an intention by the legislature to authorize
the probate court to require an executor de son tort to account for
assets not wasted or lost by delivering the same to the administratrix.3 0
36. S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 19-612 (1962).

37. 30 S.C. 270, 9 S.E. 110 (1889).
38. 31 S.C. 413, 10 S.E. 72 (1889).
39. The statute in question can only be described as a "sleeper." What may
account for its not being listed in the Model Probate Code as one of the discovery statutes is its reference to executors de son tort, under which heading
it appears in the codes. See note 32 supra.
As indicated, supra note 35, the statute is borrowed from a 1789 statute. The
latter provided that persons having possession of the personal assets of a deceased without having received letters "shall be liable to be cited by any persons
having right or claim to the property of the deceased, or creditors, by process
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The defendants also contended that the probate judge could
not require a discovery and account because, it appeared, he did
not interrogate the defendants as the statute, in their contention,
called for. The court held that it was unnecessary to interrogate
them under oath, since their answers admitted possession of certain assets. There was the further argument that the only judgment the probate court could issue was for the value of the property, but the court held that the provision for judgment for
value of the property was as to assets wasted or lost by the defendants, not those which they still held.
C. Representative's Commissions
An interesting and novel case, as far as this state is concerned,
is In re Ouzts' Estate,40 involving the allowance of executor's
commissions. The facts and the issues were simple; the resolution
not quite so easy. The testator had purchased stocks on margin,
which were held by various brokers under the customary arrangements. The stocks were registered in the names of the brokers, dividends were credited on the buyer's account, the stocks
were voted by the brokers at the order of the buyer, and sales of
stocks were made from time to time at the buyer's direction.
On the testator's death there were a large number of stocks held
in the margin accounts. These were inventoried in the testator's
estate and appraised at 1,280,872 dollars and thirty-three cents.
As against this, there was an indebtedness of 602,881 dollars and
twelve cents. At the direction of the executor the stocks were sold
by the brokers, who remitted to the executor the net of 677,991
dollars and twenty-one cents over the indebtedness. The executor
died thereafter and administrators d.b.n.c.t.a. were appointed.
The administrators claimed that the commissions to which they,
as successors of the executor, were entitled were to be calculated
on the gross value of the stock, namely, 1,280,822 dollars and
thirty-three cents. The contention in opposition to this claim was
that the representatives were entitled only to commissions on
the money actually received from the brokers, namely, 677,999
from the county courts, where there are county courts established, or ordinary

of the districts where there are no county courts or courts of chancery, to make
discovery and give account of all and singular the goods and chattels .. ." of
the deceased. Whether the legislature in 1839 intended to treat "account", as
used in the 1839 act, along with other words, in the same or in a different
sense as "give account", is a matter of speculation. There is a different flavor,
although not necessarily a different meaning, in requiring a person to "give
account" as compared to requiring an "account" from him.

40. 245 S.C. 150, 139 S.E.2d 465 (1964).
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dollars and twenty-one cents. Those opposing contentions pose
the issue.
The matter was heard in both the probate court and circuit
court, and in each it was held that commissions were allowable
only on the money remitted to the executor, and not on the gross
or aggregate value of the stocks. The South Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed.
The solution of the question of course rested upon the language
of the statute relating to representatives' commissions. That
statute provides that the representative shall receive "a sum not
exceeding the sum of two dollars and fifty cents for every hundred dollars appraised value of all personal assets which he shall
receive and the sum of two dollars and fifty cents for every hundred dollars appraised value of all personal assets which he shall
pay away ....

41 Prior to 1943, the statute, which has a long

history, allowed commissions of two dollars and fifty cents (two
and one-half percent) "for every hundred dollars which he . . .
shall receive" and the same amount "for every hundred dollars
which he . . . shall pay away ....
142 In that year the statute
was amended by inserting "appraised value of all personal assets."143 Before the amendment it had been held repeatedly that
the receipt and delivery in kind of personalty did not earn commissions for the representative, and that only the receipt and
paying over of money entitled him to commissions. The court
in this case cites as authority Turnipseed 'v. Sirrine,44 which is
one of many cases to the same effect. 45 But with the 1943 amend41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-534 (1962).
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 9017 (1942) (now S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-534 (1962).
43. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1943, p. 34.

44. 60 S.C. 272, 38 S.E. 423 (1900).
45. E.g., Herndon v. Caine, 106 S.C. 230, 91 S.E. 1 (1916); DeLoach v.
Sarratt, 58 S.C. 117, 36 S.E. 522 (1900) ; Jones v. Jones, 39 S.C. 247, 17 S.E.
587 (1892) ; College of Charleston v. Willingham, 13 Rich. Eq. 195 (S.C. 1867) ;
Gist v. Gist, 2 McCord's Eq. 473 (S.C. 1827) ; Kiddie v. Harmon, Harper's Eq.,
223 (S.C. 1824); Deas v. Spann, Harper's Eq. 176 (S.C. 1824); Ruff v.
Summers, 4 DeSaus. Eq. 529 (S.C. 1814) ; Rutledge v. Williamson, 1 DeSaus.
Eq. 159 (S.C. 1789). However, in Deas and Gist, executors who sold property
of the estate and received bonds in payment, which they delivered to the legatee,
were held entitled to commissions, the bonds being treated as equivalent to money
under the circumstances, although if they had originally been received as part
of the estate, they would not be, as in Rutledge. In Kiddle, the executors were
held entitled to commissions as for money received where they sold estate property which was purchased by a creditor who credited his debt on the purchase
price. In College of Charleston v. Willingham, it was stated that if the will
directs payment of money to a legatee who takes by agreement a security or
other property instead, the property or security is treated as money and commissions allowed. In Turnipseed v. Sirrine, supra note 44, commissions were
allowed on stocks delivered to legatees, where the will directed payment of so
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ment commissions became, and are now, allowable not only on
money but on all the personal property of the estate on the basis
of its appraisal value. The key word in the amended statute, as
in the original, is "receive"; similarly the words "pay away".
The court lays down-indeed professes to follow-the rule that
to be entitled to commissions the representative "must actually
receive the money or other personal property, and pay away the
money or distribute the personal assets in kind." It concluded,
as the basis of its affirmance, that there was no such receipt of
the stocks-only the receipt of the net after satisfying the indebtedness to the brokers.
In reaching the result, the court depended upon cases from
Missouri and New York47 in which, as here, the decedent had
purchased stock on margin, and a North Carolina case48 also
dealing with a brokerage transaction in which there were credits
and offsets. Without going into the rationale of these cases, it is
sufficient to say that the representatives were not deemed to
have received the securities on which the claim for commissions
was made.
Turning closer home, the court found two South Carolina cases
justifying the result reached. In one of them, Buerhaus v.
DeSaussure,49 executors sold a lot of land for 16,000 dollars, the
purchaser assuming a mortgage for 9,000 dollars and paying the
much money, the stock being treated as money. In DeLoach, where administrators received an insurance check and endorsed and delivered it over to a
trustee in insolvency of the intestate, administrators were held not entitled to
commissions, although it is suggested that if they had deposited the check to
their credit or instructions had been given the trustee to deposit to their credit,
the fund would have been treated as money received and paid away. See also
Lanier v. Brunson, 21 S.C. 41 (1883), involving commissions allowable to a
trustee (whose compensation is governed by the statute affecting representatives) who recovered judgment against third parties and joined with beneficiary
in releasing one defendant and assigning judgment to him, assignee paying a portion of the judgment directly to beneficiary-trustee allowed commissions as
for receiving and paying away so much money.
It is obvious from these cases that despite the insistence on "actual receipt",
constructive receipt and constructive paying away are sufficient, on one theory
or another, in some cases.
46. It re Ouzts' Estate, 245 S.C. 150, 155, 139 S.E.2d 465, 469 (1964).
47. Hitchcock v. Mosher, 136 Mo. 578, 17 S.W. 638 (1891) ; In re Mercantile
Trust Co., 210 N.Y. 83, 103 N.E. 884 (1913). For a collection of cases, including the above, see Annot., 46 A.L.R. 239 (1927). See also on whole subject of commissions on property subject to lien, pledge, etc., 21 Am. Jur.Ex'r
& Adrn'r § 521 (1939). New York has consistently followed the rule. In re
Post's Estate, 193 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Surr. Ct. 1959)-citing earlier cases and in
which it is said that the principal reasons given in New York for the rule are
that the securities have never come into possession of the representative or
that the disposition by him was a transaction in form only.
48. It re Ledbetter, 235 N.C. 642, 70 S.E.2d 667 (1952).
49. 41 S.C. 457, 19 S.E. 926 (1894).
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executors the balance. Commissions were allowed only on the
latter sum, the court saying: "This sum, therefore, was the only
amount that passed through the hands of the executors, and upon
this sum alone are the executors entitled to commissions." 50 In
the second case, SpartanburgCounty v. Arthur,rl which involved
commissions due the receivers of a closed bank (whose compensation is governed by analogy by the statute here under consideration), it was held that the receivers were not entitled to commissions upon collections made and applied by secured creditors,
the gist of the holding being that they had not actually received
the funds. The Arthur case had pointed out, the court said, that
"our Court has steadfastly adhered to an exact definition of the
word 'received' and has denied to a fiduciary any commissions
unless it could fairly be said that such fiduciary had actually
'received' into his possession funds of the estate."5 2 The court,
continuing that steadfast adherence, concluded again that there
had never been any such actual receipt as would justify allow58
ance of commissions.
In an opinion in which he concurred in the result in Ouzts'
Estate, Mr. Justice Brailsford's position was that, under the
terms of the brokerage agreement, the executor had no title to
the stocks nor actual or constructive possession, nor did he have
the right to control their disposition. Furthermore the brokers
were not obligated to hold specific certificates for the testator,
and upon the testator's death they were authorized to liquidate
the margin accounts. It was his view that "under this state of
facts, it may plausibly be put forward that the true assets of
the estate were choses in action against the brokers, rather than
50. Buerhaus v. De Saussure, 41 S.C. 457, 497-98, 19 S.E. 926, 962 (1894).
See Ball v. Brown, Bailey's Eq. 374 (S.C. 1831)-where land having been
sold by a master in equity in foreclosure action against executors and the
land was bid in by mortgagee for less than the debt, the executors were not
entitled to commissions, the court saying it could not perceiye "how these moneys
can be regarded in any shape, actually or constructively, as having been received, or paid away, by the executors." The executors were of course not entitled to commissions on the land, but their argument was that the sale produced money which was in turn paid away.
51. 180 S.C. 81, 185 S.E. 486 (1935).
52. It re Ouzts' Estate, 245 S.C. 150, 159, 139 S.E.2d 465, 473 (1965).
53. But see Griffin v. Bonham, 9 Rich. Eq. 71 (S.C. 1856), in which an
executor who was indebted to the estate was allowed commissions on the
amount of the debt although he never actually paid to himself as executor, on
the basis of the rule that a debt of the representative to the estate, not barred
by the statute of limitations at the time of his qualification, is regarded as paid
and as so much money in hand. However, the executor, who was also a creditor
of the estate, was allowed commissions only on the amount of his debt after
setoff of his claim against it.
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specific shares of stock. 54 In any event, these stocks were never
received by the executor nor paid away by him within any permissible construction of the relevant statute."5 5
In a long and forceful dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Bussey
took the position, principally, that the stocks were in the constructive possession of the executor and that this was the equivalent of the receiving demanded by the statute. He disputed the
applicability and appropriateness of the authorities relied upon
by the majority and cited a Maryland case"0 as a contrary, and
applicable, holding. On an extended review of the history of the
statute, his view was that the 1943 amendment extending commissions to the appraised value of all the personal property, as
distinguished from the earlier limitation to money, rendered the
prior South Carolina decisions on which the majority relied no
longer controlling. As he saw it, the legislative intention was
that "an executor need receive the personal assets of the estate,
properly included in the appraisal thereof, only to the extent of
being in control thereof and responsible for the proper handling
thereof in order to entitle him to commissions thereupon.""7
Since, as he regarded it, the executor had control of and responsibility for the stocks, the test for commissions was met. That
the executor had control or the right to control the stocks and
responsibility for them seems indisputable, but it is difficult to
reach a reasoned belief that the legislature intended by the
simple insertion of the words "appraised value of all personal
assets" to disturb the settled meaning of "receive" as earlier
used, or that it intended to establish a criterion for the receipt
of personal property besides money different from that governing the receipt of money. Instead, it is more reasonable to assume
that the legislature intended a single criterion for both types of
assets and that actual receipt was necessary in both cases, as
"actual" had been previously defined.
Mr. Justice Bussey expresses an appropriate concern for the
implications of the present case. So far as the result in the present case is involved, despite his dissent, it is an appealing one
54. But would not a chose in action constitute an asset? Even a bank deposit
is only a chose in action-a debt of the bank. Debts of other kinds are also
choses in action and are assets, but if they cannot be collected they cannot be
charged against the representative, even though originally appraised at their
face value. He would hardly be allowed commissions if he did not actually
collect them, whether because of inability or because of neglect.
55. In re Ouzts' Estate, 245 S.C. 150, 160, 139 S.E2d 465, 470 (1964).
56. York v. Maryland Trust Co., 150 Md. 354, 133 Atl. 128 (1926).

57. See note 55 supra.
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from the view of logic-particularly in the light of the authorities-and justice. But the dissent points out, if the receipt and
possession here were not constructive, inconsistency would result
in cases, for example, where a merchant had goods in a store
or in a warehouse, or a farmer had farm equipment, etc.,--the
representative seldom, if ever, taking actual physical possession.
He analogizes these cases to the margin accounts. Whether the
analogy is a correct one or not, there are serious questions which
may arise. Surprisingly, up to the present case there has been
no appeal litigation concerning the application of the 1943
amendment. One can only speculate-a speculation that could be
answered only by tedious review of the probate court recordsas to what allowances of commissions have been asked for or
awarded since that time in the many administrations of estates.
Suppose that in the present case the executor had paid the 600,000
dollars due on the stocks, and had actually received them, would
he be entitled to commissions for their receipt? Seemingly he
would, if actual receipt is the test, but, paradoxically, he would
be getting commissions on the stocks for their receipt and also
on the money for its receipt-which he had used to acquire the
stocks. Can the stocks, under these circumstances, be said to have
been received, when the stocks can be acquired only by the use
of money for the receipt of which the executor is already entitled
to commissions? (He is of course entitled to commissions for
paying out the money to acquire the stocks, but he would receive
such commissions for paying out the same money in the payment
of other debts or in distribution.) Suppose that the stocks, instead of being held on margin, were pledged to a bank. Would
he be entitled to commissions on the stock on redeeming and
recovering them? Or suppose he did not redeem but the bank
sold the stock without producing a surplus. Suppose he held
chattels on which there were mortgages. Would he be entitled
to commissions on the appraised value of the chattels, or on the
difference between the amount of the mortgage debts and the
appraised value-keeping in mind that he is already entitled
to commissions on the money which he may use to pay the mortgages? What would be the result if, instead of having chattels
which were security for mortgage liens, he had chattels which
were subject to genuine conditional sale contracts? Would he be
entitled to commissions on those chattels? Other questions in
this vein might be suggested, and while undoubtedly authorities
elsewhere can be found, the questions are asked to point up the
problem that the dissenting justice has raised.
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D. Consteuction of WiZ--Ambliguity
The case of Shelley v. Shelley5" is an admirable one for its
exposition of many of the rules for the construction of wills
and of the rules relating to the introduction of extrinsic evidence
to aid in their interpretation. The action was one to construe a
will so as to determine the dividing line between two tracts, part
of a larger tract, devised separately to two children of the
testator.
The will gave a life estate to the testator's wife and then made
provision for the remainder estates, including the following:
The home place . . . is to be divided between Bevin Shelley and Lanneau Shelley: Bevin Shelley to have the southern
part, same to include the filling station site, one tenant house
and two tobacco barns; Lanneau to have the northern part
which includes the house where he lives, the home house,
three tobacco barns and two small houses now on the land
also porkhouse and stalls.5 9
The master in equity to whom the case was referred construed
the language to mean that the testator intended that the land
should be equally divided in acreage between the two sons. The
circuit court substantially agreed with the master and appointed
commissioners to make a division of the property based on equality of acreage. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed.
As a preliminary to a recital of further facts the supreme
court marshalled most of the familiar rules of construction and
with them as a guide concluded, contrary to the findings below,
that there was nothing in the will showing an intention that the
property should be equally divided, and that if an equal division
in acreage were to be made it would manifestly distort the description in the will, particularly in view of the delineation of
the buildings which were to go to the respective devisees. Considering the number and locations of the buildings, it was evident
that an equal division was not intended.
A group of the facts that impelled the lower court to order
an equal division, or perhaps to bolster an already formed opinion that such a division was intended, related to the tobacco
barns on the farm, their number and condition both before and
after the making of the will. At the time of the execution of the
will the testator had five barns, which were numbered in the
58. 244 S.C. 598, 137 S.E.2d 851 (1964).
59. Shelley v. Shelley, 244 S.C. 598, 600, 137 S.E2d 851, 852 (1964).
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record 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Barn number 1 was at the extreme northern portion of the tract; barn number 3 was at about the center,
barn number 4 somewhat south of the center, and barns numbers
.5 and 6 near the southern end. It would appear, the opinion
stated, that, considering the facts existing at the time the will
was made, the land embracing barns numbers 1, 3 and 4 was to
pass to the devisee of the northern portion, and the land embracing barns numbers 5 and 6 to the devisee of the southern portion.
A complicating fact, however, was that two years after the execution of the will the testator had built a new barn, numbered 2
in the record, to the north of barn number 3, and north of the
center. Barn number 5, near the southern end, was much older
and much less valuable than the other barns. Quoting from the
opinion:
The master concluded that the testator had the construction of tobacco barn number 2 in contemplation at the time
he made his will, and that after the construction thereof,
due to the age of tobacco barn number five, testator was
possessed of only five good tobacco barns, of which he intended Bevin to have two. He, therefore, reasoned that the
testator intended Bevin to have tobacco barn number 4 in
lieu of tobacco barn number 560
The legal reasoning of the master, which was adopted by the
circuit court, was that the will spoke as of the death of the testator, and that as there were only five barns of any value at the
time of his death, the line should be drawn so as to allocate barn
number 4 to Bevin in place of the supposedly valueless barn
number 5. Commissioners appointed by the circuit court drew a
meandering line to encompass barn number 4, and also to embrace an equal acreage, for the benefit of the devisee of the southern portion. Of this disposition the supreme court bluntly concluded: "We see nothing in the will or the evidence which would
indicate that the testator intended any such results."'" The court
agreed that a will speaks as of the testator's death, but stated that
it speaks "of what was in the mind of the testator at the date
when the will was signed and has to be construed in the light of
the factual circumstances at the time of the signing of the will." 62
60. Id. at 604, 137 S.E.2d at 856.
61. Id. at 605, 137 S.E.2d at 856.
62. Ibid., citing Charleston Library Society v. Citizen's & So. Nat'l Bank,
200 S.C. 96, 20 S.E.2d 623 (1942). The master in equity had cited as supporting his position First Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 206 S.C. 402, 34 S.E.2d 678 (1944).
There is no conflict in these cases. It is essentially a matter of what the testator
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In considering the will the court stated that it was apparent
that "when the language of the will is applied to the property
involved, a latent ambiguity, equivocation or uncertainty arises
as to where the testator intended the line to be."013 On the other
band, the circuit jhdge had concluded that there was no ambiguity in the will, either patent or latent, and that it was improper to resort to extrinsic evidence, although, as the opinion
points out, both the master and the circuit judge must have gone
outside the will to reach their conclusions. With the premise that
the will did contain a latent ambiguity, the court held that the
refusal of the lower court to permit resort to extrinsic evidence
desigued to show the testator's intention as to the dividing line
was in error. It quoted apt language from an old much-cited case,
McCall v. McCall1:04
In ascertaining the subject of a testator's disposition the
court may inquire into the situation of his estate, and into
every material fact which is auxiliary to the just interpretation of the words, for the purpose of identifying the thing
intended by the words employed.
Any evidence is admissible which merely intends to explain and apply what the testator has written; and no evidence can be admitted which merely shows what he intended
to write. 65
It is familiar law that latent ambiguities may be resolved by
extrinsic evidence, 0 and in this respect the expressions of the
court are not novel or significant. But what is significant is the
attitude of the court towards the question of the admissibility of
the testator's declarations as to his intention, a matter on which
there is not completely uniform opinion. The subject is a complex
one. The whole field of admissibility of extrinsic evidence, with
intends. Cases dealing with the principle are numerous, e.g., Stanton v. David,
193 S.C. 108, 7 S.E.2d 852 (1940); Beckwith v. McAlister, 165 S.C. 1, 162
S.E. 623 (1932); Landrum v. Branyon, 161 S.C. 235, 159 S.E. 546 (1939);
Scaife v. Thomson, 15 S.C. 337 (1880) ; Garrett v. Garrett, 2 Strob. Eq. 272
(S.C. 1848); Long v. Wier, 2 Rich. Eq. 283 (S.C. 1846).
63. Shelley v. Shelley, 244 S.C. 598, 603, 137 S.E.2d 851, 855 (1964).

64. 4 Rich. Eq. 447 (S.C. 1852).
65. Shelley v. Shelley, supra note 63 quoting McCall v. McCall supra note
64 at 455.
66. The cases are almost too numerous for mention, see, but e.g., Ex parte
King, 132 S.C. 63, 128 S.E. 850 (1925) ; Jennings v. Talbert, 77 S.C. 454, 58 S.E.
420 (1907)-perhaps the most frequently cited as touching upon patent and
latent ambiguities; Sherman v. Angel, Bailey's Eq. 351 (S.C. 1831) ; Donald v.
Dendy, 2 McMul. 123 (S.C. 1841); Patterson v. Leith, 2 Hill's Eq. 15 (S.C.

1834).
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particular focus upon the issue of the testator's declarations, has
recently been surveyed, and attention given notably to Shelley.6 7
It is not necessary, therefore, to go over all of the same ground.
It is sufficient to point out that the court in the present case
has opened the door (if indeed it was ever closed) to direct evidence of the testator's intentions-namely his statements of his
intentions-such as, though not limited to, his oral or written
instructions. It does not appear from the report of the case what
the testator's utterances of intention were but the record does
contain them. How the declarations should be treated appears
from the following:
Since some of the testimony offered in this case dealt with
declarations by the testator himself, we think it well to point
out that while declarations of intention on the part of a
testator are ordinarily excluded from consideration, they
are, nevertheless, according to the great weight of authority,
receivable to assist in interpreting an equivocation, or latent
ambiguity. The prohibitory exception is based on the risk
of allowing an extrinsic utterance of intent to come into
competition with the terms of the document on the same
subject and perhaps to prevail against them. In the case of
an equivocation, or latent ambiguity, this risk does not exist.
There can be no competition with the words of the document
by declarations which merely expound and make more specific the words used in the document. See Wigmore on Evidence, Section 2472.68
As indicated, the quoted language is a paraphrase from Wigmore. The rule thus announced by the court would be simple of
application except for two things: (1) it is not clear whether
the expression "equivocation, or latent ambiguity," (note the
setting off by commas) means (a) "equivocation, that is, latent
ambiguity," (b) equivocation as a species of latent ambiguity, (c) either equivocation or latent ambiguity, or (d) equivocation or other latent ambiguity; (2) "equivocation" has been
variously defined, so much so that the term itself is an equivocation. The suggested lack of clarity is not entirely the court's doing: Wigmore's heading of the section referred to is "§ 2472.
Same (1) Exception for Equivocation, or Latent Ambiguity."
In his Code of Evidence, keyed to this particular edition of his
67. See Note, Admissibility of Testator's Declarationsof Intention, 17 S.C.L.
IRv. 276 (1965).
68. Shelley v. Shelley, supra note 63 at 606, 137 S.E.2d at 857.
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work, his heading for the corresponding section or article is "Art.
2. Same. Exception for Equivocation (or Latent Ambiguity)."6 9
It should be noted too, as already set out, that elsewhere in the
present case the court says that "when the language of the will
is applied to the property involved, a latent ambiguity, equivocation or uncertainty arises as to where the testator intended the
line to be."7 0 In the immediate setting in which these words

appear, they do not have relevance to the issue of declarations
of the testator's intention, but it is inferable that the terms
"equivocation" and "latent ambiguity" as used here have the
same connotation as where they are used in the later language
just discussed.
For further expansion of the problem the reader is referred
to Wigmore 71 and to the previously mentioned note on the subject.72 At any rate, it is sufficient, and important, to note again
that in some cases evidence of the testator's declarations of intention is permissible. What these cases are is of course another
matter, and the pronouncement of the court in the present case
is not to be taken as approval of the testator's declarations of
intention in every instance of ambiguous language-particularly
as to estates created, limitations, etc.-nor as overruling by implication any of the cases in which such declarations have been
excluded.73 On the other hand, if the statement is to be accepted
as a holding that any latent ambiguity may be resolved through
the use of direct evidence of intention, it would go beyond and
enlarge the scope of the cases in which the resolution has been
made to depend upon, among other things, the utterances and
conduct of the testator which were indirect evidences of his
intention,7 4 and to permit direct evidence as well. Furthermore,
69.

WIGmom, CODE OF EVIDENCE §§

2737-38 (3d ed. 1942).

70. See note 63 supra.

71.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§§ 2470-77 (3d ed. 1940).

72. Supra note 67.

73. E.g., Capps v. Richardson, 215 S.C. 34, 53 S.E.2d 876 (1949); Peoples

Nat'l Bank v. Harrison, 198 S.C. 457, 18 S.E.2d 1 (1941) ; Beckwith v. McAlister, supra note 62; Smith v. Heyward, 115 S.C. 145, 104 S.E. 473 (1920);
Clark v. Clarke, 46 S.C. 230, 24 S.E. 202, (1895) ; McAllister v. Tate, 11 Rich.
509 (S.C. 1858); Coffin v. Elliott, 9 Rich. Eq. 244 (S.C. 1857); Hall v. Hall,
8 Rich. 407 (S.C. 1852) ; Pell v. Ball, Speer's Eq. 48 (S.C. 1843) ; Rothmahler
v. Myers, 4 DeSaus. Eq. 215 (S.C. 1827). A fortiori such declarations will
not be permitted for filling up blanks or supplying ommissions. McDonald v.
Fagan, 118 S.C. 510, 111 S.E. 793 (1921); Rosborough v. Hemphill, 5 Rich.
Eq. 95 (S.C. 1852).
74. E.g., Wells v. Salvation Army, 190 S.C. 484, 3 S.E2d 601 (1939) ; I re
Robb's Estate, 37 S.C. 19, 16 S.E. 241 (1891); Powers v. McEachern, 7 S.C.
290 (1876) ; Donald v. Dendy, smpra note 66.
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if misdescription of persons or things creates a latent ambiguity,75 and if, as just stated, direct evidence of intention is permitted for all types of latent ambiguities, then errors in description can more readily be removed by the inclusion or additional
use of such evidence when it is available.70 These conclusions are,
of course, assumptions on assumptions; and whether in the future the court will actually follow this train of consequences
or will select among the various conflicting authorities cannot be
foretold.
E. Trusts-Tustee's Aoguisition of Interest
The case of Byrd v. King7 7 was an action to set aside a deed

made by the life beneficiary of a trust conveying his interest to
the wife of one of the trustees. A secondary action in the case
was a demand against a surviving trustee and the representatives
of a deceased trustee for an accounting to which the plaintiff
claimed he was entitled by reason of an earlier transfer of his
interest for a term of years.
The record is very voluminous and displays a great array of
conflicting assertions of fact which the report of the case reduces
to much smaller proportions. Briefly, the plaintiff, life beneficiary under a trust, in 1950 transferred his beneficial interest
to the wife of one of the trustees. She died testate in 1954, leaving the interest thus acquired to her husband. Her estate was duly
closed out. The husband died testate in 1956, and the interest
passed to his children. The administration of his estate was completed in due course. This action to set aside the deed was instituted in 1960.
The other branch of the action was based on a transfer in 1945
of the beneficial interest for a period of ten years-overlapping
the 1950 transfer-to the trustees, two in number, who had been
75. That misdescription is so treated: Smith v. Coxe, 183 S.C. 509, 191 S.E.
402 (1936) ; Ex parte King, supra note 66.
76. WiGoRE, EVIDENCE § 2474 (3d ed. 1940) discusses the question of whether the rule for exception for equivocation applies to erroneous descriptions.
He favors its use, although he admits there are cases to the contrary. See also
ATIUNsoN, WILLS § 60 (2d ed. 1953). Numerous South Carolina cases have
dealt with misdescription, applying the falsa demonstratio doctrine to clear up
the mistake. In none of them does there appear any issue as to whether direct
evidence was permissible, the solution being reached from the circumstances.
E.g., Foreign Mission Board v. Gaines, 42 F. Supp. 85 (E.D.S.C. 1941); Wells

v. Salvation Army,

supra note 74; Ex parte King, supra note 66; Smith v.

Heyward, supra note 73; McCall v. McCall, supra, note 64.

77. 245 S.C. 247, 140 S.E.2d 158 (1965).
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appointed in 1940 to succeed original trustees. An accounting
was demanded from the last stated date.
The basic contention of the plaintiff with respect to both
aspects of the case was the alleged impropriety of the two transactions. As to the first, the contention was-quoting from the
case--"that a purchase of trust property by the wife of a trustee
is improper and voidable by the cestui que trust even though
the transaction 78is free from actual fraud and supported by a fair
consideration."
Both the master in equity and the circuit court found that the
transaction was a fair one,
that there was no market for the sale of such an interest,
that the appellant had time to secure independent advice,
that he was familiar with his legal rights, that no material
facts were withheld from him, that Mrs. McCown [the wife]
was an independent agent, that the appellant had not explained his delay in bringing this suit, that parties and witnesses were not available and their estates had been administered and that the appellant had consented to the transaction. 79
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in
the light of the concurrent findings of the master and the circuit
court, it would not disturb those findings, which, it concluded
after review of the record, were not without evidentiary support
or against the clear weight of the evidence. Thus acceding to the
found facts, the court affirmed, applying what it deemed the
applicable rules of law. It also concurred in the holding below
that in any event the suit was barred by laches and the statute
of limitations.
The main legal principle on which the appellant relied, as has
been noted, was that, in itself, a transfer by a trustee to his wife
is voidable without regard to fairness. The case cited in support
80
was Soottish-American Mortgage Co. v. 0lowney, in which a
sale by a trustee to his wife was held to be voidable. The court
differentiated that case on the ground that there had been no
consent by the beneficiary to the transfer, as there was here.
The court relied upon the rules laid down in the Restatement of
78. Byrd v. King, 245 S.C. 247, 256, 140 S.E.2d 158, 164 (1965).

79. Ibid.
80. 70 S.C. 229, 49 S.E. 569 (1904).
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Trusts"1 as governing the case, as apparently did also the master
and the circuit court. In these rules (set out in the last numbered
footnote) that governing the adverse interest is specifically
applicable. It is pointed out in the comment to this rule, in both
the original version of the Restatement and its revision, that this
rule is in addition to the other requirements. It would appear
that, in the court's view, this additional requirement of fair
and reasonable consideration, as well as the other requirements,
was met.
Although the law condemns a fiduciary's self-dealing, direct
or indirect, yet here if the facts were as the court found them,
or as it accepted them from the master and the circuit court, the
result would clearly be correct, not only from the rules of the
Restatement but from the holdings of the South Carolina cases
as well. Starting with "A, trustee for B," the cases fall generally
into these factual types: (1) A, trustee for B, sells to A; (2) A
sells to A, trustee for B; (3) B sells his interest to A. In the first
two situations, the cases are consistent to the point that, without
regard to fairness and adequacy of consideration, the beneficiary
has the right to avoid the transaction 8 2 leaving aside the ques81.

RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS

§ 216 (1935). The reference is to the earlier ver-

sion of the Restatement, 1935. The excerpt quoted by the court is: "Sec. 216Consent of Beneficiary. (1) Except as stated in Subsection (2) and as limited
by Secs. 255 and 242(2), a beneficiary cannot hold the trustee liable for an
act or omission of the trustee as a breach of trust if the beneficiary prior to
or at the time of the act or omission consented to it. (2) The consent of the
beneficiary does not preclude him from holding the trustee liable for breach
of trust, if (a) the beneficiary was under an incapacity at the time of such
consent, or of such act or omission; or (b) the beneficiary, when he gave his
consent, did not know of his rights and of the material facts which the trustee
knew or should have known and which the trustee did not reasonably believe
that the beneficiary knew; or (c)the consent of the beneficiary was induced
by improper conduct of the trustee; or (d) the beneficiary was not of competent age or understanding; or (e) the trustee had an adverse interest in the
transaction, and the transaction to which the beneficiary consented involved
a bargain which was not fair and reasonable."
In the present version of the Restatement-RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS
§ 216 (1959)-the language is somewhat different although the substance is
the same. The important relevant language of the revision is "(2). Where the
trustee has an adverse interest in the transaction, the consent of the beneficiary
does not preclude him from holding the trustee liable for a breach of trust not
only under the circumstances stated in Subsection (1) [incapacity, lack of disclosure, improper conduct by the trustee], but also if the transaction to which
the beneficiary consented was not fair and reasonable." See also RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS § 170 comment w.; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 170 comment w.
82. As to sale by the trustee to himself individually, among the many cases
are these which are particularly forceful: Farrar v. Farley, 3 S.C. 11 (1871) ;
Clarke v. DeVeaux, 1 S.C. 172 (1869); Sollee v. Croft, 7 Rich. Eq. 34 (S.C.
1854); Zimmerman v. Harmon, 4 Rich. Eq. 165 (S.C. 1851); Ex parte
Wiggins, 1 Hill's Eq. 353 (S.C. 1834). The rule applies where the sale is
made by the trustee to his wife. Scottish-American Mortgage Co. v. Clowney,
mtpra note 80, relied upon by the appellant and distinguished by the court.
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tions of consent and laches. In the third type of cases, the transaction is not voidable at the option of the beneficiary, but the
burden is on the purchasing fiduciary to show good faith, full
disclosure, adequacy of consideration, and so on.8 3 The present

case is treated apparently by the court as falling into the first
group of cases in which voidability is afforded, and which would
have been available to the beneficiary here but for his consent and
delay. The case would more precisely seem to fall into the third
group-a transfer by the beneficiary to the trustee-which does
not in itself give rise to the privilege of avoidance. Since the
criteria for preclusion are the same in both cases-that is to say,
whether there is consent to the transfer by the trustee to himself,
or whether there is transfer by the beneficiary to the trusteethe result would not be different in the present case whether it
was put in on category or the other.
The court also cites as supporting its conclusion a case relied
upon by the master in equity, Hamer v. David, 4 in which the
beneficiary of a trust, after assigning his interest (not to the
trustee, but to one with whom he was apparently acting in connivance) and subsequently ratifying it by receiving yearly benefits thereunder, and delaying bringing action thereon for more
than five years, was barred from asserting a claim that assignment had been fraudulently procured.8 5 That ratification or affirmance after the act or omission of the trustee may bar subsequent assertion of breach of trust is a principle accepted by the
Restatement,8" subject to the same rules as for consent, and is also
accepted in the South Carolina cases, none of which other than
Under extraordinary circumstances the rule of voidability may not be applied
against the purchasing trustee. Honeywell v. Dominick, 223 S.C. 365, 75 S.E.2d
59 (1963). Purchases by executors and administrators from themselves are
governed by statute. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 19-519 to -520 (1962).
Cases in which the trustee as an individual sells to the trust are not so
numerous. Pritchard v. Gage, 29 F. Supp. 290 (E.D.S.C. 1939)-which is a
case involving alleged sale to the trust by a corporate trustee, purchase by trust
department of securities held by another department of the trustee bank; McCants v. McBee, 1 McCord's Eq. 383 (S.C. 1826). Cf. Blankenship v. Zimmerman, 188 S.C. 413, 199 S.E. 527 (1938). In Thomson v. Peake, 38 S.C. 440,
17 S.E. 45 (1892), a trustee managing a farm rented to himself as trustee mules
for use on the farm; he was held entitled to pay for their hire only because
the beneficiary consented.

83. See, e.g., Ex Parte Gadsden, 89 S.C. 352, 71 S.E. 952 (1911) ; Tindall v.
Sublet, 82 S.C. 199, 63 S.E. 960 (1908) (transfer to fiduciary's wife) ; Waldrop

v. Leaman, 30 S.C. 428, 9 S.E. 446 (1888) ; Gregg v. Harllee, Dudley's Eq. 42
(S.C. 1837) ; Poag v. Poag, 1 Hill's Eq. 285 (S.C. 1833) ; McCants v. McBee,

supra note 82; Butler v. Haskell, 4 DeSaus. Eq. 651 (S.C. 1817).
84. 138 S.C. 491, 136 S.E. 744 (1927).
85. Ibid.
86. RESTATEFENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 218 (1959).
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Hamer, involves a condition of adverse interest on the part of
the trustee.8 7 The Restatement view, however, with respect to
affirmance, is that even though the beneficiary may be precluded
by affirmance unless he was under incapacity, or was unaware
of his rights, or unless the affirmance was induced by improper
conduct by the trustee, he-the beneficiary-is not precluded if
the transaction involved a bargain with the trustee which was
not fair and reasonable.8 8 In other words, in a transaction involving a bargain with the trustee ratification is not by itself
enough-in addition to capacity, disclosure and so on, the bargain
must be fair and reasonable-an element which would not be
necessary for effective ratification if adverse interest was not
involved. However, although the court did not concern itself
with this area of the Restatement, the result would have been
the same, since, if it were a matter of ratification as distinguished from advance consent, the requisite of a fair and reasonable transaction was present.
This observation-of ratification-is particularly relevant as
it may concern the other transaction complained of by the plaintiff-the transfer by him for a term of years to the trustees at
a stated return. It was found here also that the transaction was
a fair one and freed from any disabling qualities. That transaction can be tested by the same standards as those employed
in the transfer to the trustee's wife; and the same commentsespecially concerning the distinction between a transfer by a
trustee to himself with the consent of the beneficiary and the
transfer by the beneficiary to the trustee-are applicable.
The court found that in the period between 1940, when the
trustees were appointed, and 1945, the accounting made by the
trustees was proper, and that the beneficiary's life interest having
been properly surrendered to the trustee's wife in 1950 he was
not entitled in any event to demand an accounting after that date.
F. Legislation-Jurisdictionof Probate Matters-'onstitutiona
Amendment
Attention has already been called in another part of this survey-and reference to it should be made 8 9 -to a change in the
South Carolina Constitution of 1895 relating to jurisdiction per87. Pickett v. Geer, 156 S.C. 346, 153 S.E. 349 (1930) ; Farr v. Gilreath, 23

S.C. 502 (1885)-both involving improper sale by trustee to third person.
88. RESTATEMENT (SEcoxm), TRuSTS § 218(d), comment e(1959).
89. Supra note 21.
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taining to probate matters. The pendency of the proposed
amendment was commented upon in an earlier survey article in
the Routh CarolinaLaw Review.9" As noted there, the principal
change is to take from the Charleston County probate court its
special constitutional status and to make it subject to legislative
power to the same degree as other probate courts. The purpose
of this change was to prepare the way for a probate code of
statewide application. The proposed probate code has since been
introduced in the house of representatives 9 1 and is now in the
hands of its judiciary committee.
In addition to the change just mentioned, there is a change
in the description of persons of unsound mind--"persons mentally incompetent"; and there is deletion of the earlier provision
relating to dower. The elimination of the dower provision also
looks to the proposed probate code, which abolishes dower 92 and
in substitution makes the surviving husband or wife a forced
heir-i.e., privileged to dissent from the will of the other and
take a stated share. 93
G. Investment Statutes
The law governing investments by fiduciaries has been subjected to radical change by the general assembly in a brief, but
comprehensive act,9 4 striking out certain then existing statutes
and substituting a new measure of standards. Because of their
importance the substituted sections are set out here in full.
90. 17 S.C.L. Rav. 190 (1964).
91. H. 1748 (1965).
92. Proposed Probate Code § 173.
93. Id. §§ 174-82.
94. S.C. Acrs & J.REs. 1965, p. 298 (now designated as S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 67-58 to -61 (Supp. 1965). The title of the act is "An Act To Amend Sections 67-58, 67-59, 67-60 and 67-61, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, Relating To Investment by Fiduciaries, So As To Adopt The Uniform 'Prudent
man Investment Act"' There is no reference in the body of the statute to this
so-called uniform act. In reality there is no such "uniform" act-at least not
one promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, from which uniform laws are regarded as emanating-and it may
therefore be inaccurate to state that a uniform act is being adopted. It may
properly be said, if at all, that it is an act commonly or popularly known as the
"prudent man investment act." Although the statute is not an adoption of a
uniform law, it is a copy of a model or widely used statute which, alone or
coupled with other provisions, has been enacted in many states. The same
language, with minor variations in some cases, appears as, or is included in, the
investment statutes of at least nineteen states. See BOGERT, TRuSTS & TRUSTEES
§§ 616-63 (2d ed. 1959 and Supp. 1964). Professor Bogert refers to these
statutes as embodying the "prudent investor" rule: BOGERT, op. cit. § 613.
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Section 1. Section 67-58 amended-care required of fiduciary. Section 67-58, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962,
is amended by striking it in its entirety and inserting in
lieu thereof the following:
Section 67-58. In acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging, retaining, selling and managing property for the
benefit of another, a fiduciary shall exercise the judgment
and care under the circumstances then prevailing, which
men of prudence, discretion and intelligence exercise in the
management of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of their
funds, considering the probable income as well as the probable safety of their capital. Within the limits of the foregoing standard, a fiduciary is authorized to acquire and
retain every kind of property and every kind of investment,
specifically including but not by way of limitation, bonds,
debentures and other corporate obligations, and stocks, preferred or common, and within the limitations of the foregoing standard a fiduciary may retain property properly
acquired, without limitation as to time and without regard
to its suitability for original purchase.
Section 2. Section 67-59 amended--meaning of certain
terms. Section 67-59, Code of South Carolina, 1962, is
amended by striking it in its entirety and inserting in lieu
thereof the following:
Section 67-59. The provisions of sections 67-58, 67-60 and
67-61 shall not be construed as authorizing any departure
from, or variation of, the express terms or limitations set
forth in any will, agreement, court order or other instrument creating or defining the fiduciary's duties and powers,
but the term "legal investment" or "authorized investment" or
words of similar import, as used in any such instrument,
shall be taken to mean any investment which is permitted
by the terms of section 67-58.
Section 3. Section 67-60 amended-certain powers of
courts not to be affected. Section 67-60, Code of Laws, South
Carolina, 1962, is amended by striking it in its entirety and
inserting in lieu thereof the following:
Section 67-60. The provisions of sections 67-58, 67-59 and
67-61 shall not be construed as restricting the power of a
court of proper jurisdiction to permit a fiduciary to deviate
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from the terms of any will, agreement, or other instrument
relating to the acquisition, investment, reinvestment, exchange, retention, sale or management of fiduciary property.
Section 4. Section 67-61 amended-sections to govern certain fiduciaries. Section 67-61, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, is amended by striking it in its entirety and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
Section 67-61. The provisions of sections 67-58, 67-59 and
67-60 shall govern fiduciaries acting under wills, agreements, court orders and other instruments now existing or
hereafter made.
In rewording section 67-58 by the substitution of the prudent
man rule, the new statute reconstructs the principal investment
statute which contained a lengthy list of approved investments.
Inadvertently perhaps there is failure to repeal section 67-58.1,
which permits investments in federal farm loan bonds, federal
farm mortgage corporation bonds, federal intermediate credit
bank debentures, and central bank for cooperatives debentures.
These four types of securities were included in section 67-58, and
section 67-58.1 was repetitive in this respect.
Until the passage of the first of the investment statutes, in
1918,95 which authorized investment in federal farm loan bonds,
the applicable rule for investments was the same as that prescribing the standard of care for fiduciaries generally. In Mayer
v. Mordeai,96 which is typical of several cases, it was said: When a trustee is not limited or directed by the instrument
under which he acts, and is left to the discretion of his own
judgment, our cases hold that his discretion must be exercised with the same diligence and care that a prudent man
would bestow on his own concerns.
It is not to be understood by this that, wherever loss
ensues from the investment of the trustee, he will be excused
by showing that persons of care and prudence, in the management of their own affairs, made investments of the same
character and were disappointed in the results. A prudent
man, dealing with his own means, might employ them in
speculations promising large gains, or loan them on personal
security, or invest in the stocks of railroad companies or
other private corporations. If a trustee should, however, so
95. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1918, p. 763.

96. 1 S.C. 383 (1869).
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loan, or engage in such enterprises, at the expense of the
interests committed to his charge, he could not claim excuse
by pointing to the course of individuals, noted for their
prudence, by whose example he had been misled.9 7
Except for the reference to stocks in the passage quoted, the
rule stated there is substantially the same in general terms as the
rule of prudence prescribed in the new section 67-58.98 If there
had been, or were, no investment statutes, the prudent man rule
would still obtain, although there might be, as has been the case,
modification of decisional views as to whether particular types
of investments met the requirements of the rule. It is obvious
that the first investment statute of 1918, authorizing a particular
investment, was not designed to restrict investments to the single
type thus authorized, and that the prudent man rule continued.
With new statutes added over the years, and existing statutes
enlarged, culminating principally in section 67-58 of the 1962
Code, there may have been ground for assumption that despite
the phrase "may be invested" in that section, as in its earlier
versions, the statute was mandatory, rather than permissive, and
restricted the fiduciary to the investments there mentioned, 99
97. Mayer v. Mordecai, supra note 96, at 383. See also Wannamaker v. State
Bank, 176 S.C. 133, 155, 179 S.E. 896 (1935) ; Hutchinson v. Daniel, 170 S.C.
459, 171 S.E. 13 (1933) ; Oakes' Estate v. Oakes, 170 S.C. 167, 169 S.E. 890
(1933) ; In re Willcox, 162 S.C. 133, 160 S.E. 260 (1931) ; O'Dell v. Young,
McMul. Eq. 155 (S.C. 1829).
98. The critical central language adopted by the new section is not new. It
goes back to the classic Massachusetts case of Harvard College v. Amory, 26
Mass. 446, 461 (1831), which declares: "He is to observe how men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation,
but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the
probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested."
If it is correct to say that the quoted South Carolina expression from Mayer v.
Mordecai, supra note 96, is basically the same as the opening language of the
new § 67-58, then since that language is the language of Amory, the South
Carolina rule has always been the same as the Massachusetts rule-which is
commonly regarded as the typical expression, if not the genesis, of the prudent
man rule vis-a-vis investments. Of course, what one court professing to follow
the prudent man rule may regard as a proper investment in a particular case
may not find assent in another court professing to follow the same rule. For
example, many courts adhering to the rule have allowed investment in stocks;
statute)
haveCarolinanot." As
others, including South Carolina (exceptstate-and
as changed
of South
true
thisby
more later. Even in the same
stocks,
to
the broad rule of prudence remains, specific applications may change.
while
99. There does not seem to be any definitive judicial statement in this state
on the point. Professor Bogert's interpretation of the earlier South Carolina
statute is: "The following states have adopted a limited or modified version
of the prudent man rule ... South Carolina." BOGERT, supra note 94, § 612
n. 19. On the other hand, in LORING, A TRusTvE's HANDBOOK App. 1I, 372,
378 (Farr Rev. 1962), South Carolina is listed as one of the states falling into
the following classification: "The following states cannot be said to follow the
prudent man rule of investment in whole or in part... ." One may independent-
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except where elsewhere in the statutes there appeared specific
sanction for other securities. From time to time, with the advent
of new security--issuing governmental or government-related
agencies, the legislature has authorized fiduciary investment in
the securities of such bodies. Some of those statutes were included in the old section 67-58, others still remain on the statute
books100 and have not been purged or stricken by the new section
67-58 as specifically sanctioned investments-an inconsistency at
once apparent in the submerging of the investments specifically
authorized in the old section into the prudent man rule. The
accretion of these specifically authorized investments would tend
to fortify a belief that the old section 67-58 and the additional
statutes created a legal list. At any rate, the prudent man rule
now governs without question by virtue of the new section 67-58;
but the extent to which the cases stating what investments were
or were not acceptable under the prudent man rule will control
as to those investments is a matter of some conjecture. For example, the cases prior to 1947-when a great enlargement of permissible investments, including stocks, took place in the
statutes' 0 1-investment in stocks of private corporations was
regarded as improper unless authorized expressly or impliedly
by the trust instrument. 0 2 If stocks were not specifically mentioned in the new statute, would an investment in them be proper
in the light of the cases condemning them as unsuitable for
acquisition by a prudent man acting as fiduciary? The same
kind of question might more precisely be asked concerning investments not specifically mentioned in the new statute: would such
unmentioned investments be governed by the local cases, as, for
§ 67-58,
and other specific investment statutes, as its expression of what a prudent man
in the role of fiduciary could or ought to do.
100. Fiduciaries are expressly permitted to invest in: State Highway bonds
and certificates of indebtedness S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-263 (1962) ; bonds of state
ly conclude that the South Carolina legislature formulated the older

agricultural marketing commission-§ 3-229; bonds of Greenville County Mar-

keting Commission-§ 3-300.6; state school bonds-§ 21-988; housing authority
bonds-§ 36-163; mortgages insured by the federal housing administrator, debentures issued by him, and securities issued by national mortgage associations§ 36-602; bonds of Home Owners Loan Corporation-§ 36-604. The list is
partial. For fuller list see Investnents in the Index of the S.C. CODE ANN.
(1962).
Common trust funds are permitted and regulated by S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-587
to -599.7, as amended in S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1965, p. 608 (now S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 8-587 to -599.3 (Supp. 1965).
101. S.C. Acrs & 3. RES., 1947, p. 558. It is basically the old Section 67-58.
102. Beacham v. Ross, 187 S.C. 398, 197 S.E. 369 (1938) ; Mayer v. Mordecai,
supra note 96; Nance v. Nance, 1 S.C. 209 (1869); Allen v. Gaillard, 1 S.C.
279 (1869) (the last two forbidding investment in railroad stocks and bonds);
Lesesne v. Cheves, 105 S.C. 432, 90 S.E. 37 (1916).
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example, an investment in land-as distinguished from an obligation reinforced by the security of land .1°3
It may reasonably be assumed that, in the abrogation of the
old section 67-58, it was not intended that the list of approved
investments it contained would no longer be permissible. As
tested by the prudent man rule they would seem to be proper
and since they represent a legislative conception of the investments a prudent man might make, there can sensibly be the further conclusion that that conception-with regard to those particular investments-has not changed. On the other hand in
expressly authorizing investment in stocks, bonds and debentures,
the older statute imposed severe restrictions as to the kinds of
corporate obligations and stocks-their record, etc.-and the
amount of trust funds that could be used in their purchase. This
limitation has now disappeared, and with it any legislative
opinion that the restrictions were such as a prudent man would,
on his own, observe. It was these restrictions on stock and other
corporate obligation investments that probably furnished the
greatest stimulus to the advocates of the new legislation to press
for its passage and thereby remove the restrictions. Similarly,
there was a limitation with respect to the percentage amount
(sixty percent) that could be loaned on real estate mortgages. Is
the disappearance of this limitation, as with the disappearance of
any mention of real estate mortgages, to be taken as authorizing
a mortgage investment where the equity of the owner is lessV1 0 4
The older section 67-58 contained severe prohibitions against
103. Gulick v. Slaten, 169 S.C. 244, 168 S.E. 697 (1932); Smith v. Moore,
109 S.C. 196, 95 S.E. 351 (1917); Morton v. Adams, 1 Strob. Eq. 172 (S.C.
1846) (all holding investment in land improper). It is held generally.

BOGERT,

supra note 94, § 678; 3 Scor, TRUSTS § 227.6 (2d ed. 1956). Quaere; whether

the phrase "every kind of property" in the new S.C. CODE ANN. § 67-58 authorizes investment in land.
104. Before any statutory mention was made of real estate mortgages, it was

held or stated that a mortgage on unencumbered real estate was proper. Hutchinson v. Daniel, supra note 97 (suggesting that loan should not be made in
excess of two-thirds of value) ; Leaphart v. National Surety Co., 167 S.C. 327,
166 S.E. 415 (1932); Nance v. Nance, mipra note 102; Spear v. Wood, 9 Rich.

Eq. 184 (S.C. 1857). Note that the old S.C. CoDE ANN. § 67-58 limits to sixty
percent. With the sixty percent limitation expunged, will prudence be governed
by Hutchinson, which professedly adheres to the prudent man rule?
In Singleton v. Lowndes, 9 S.C. 465 (1877), the court sanctioned an investment in a mortgage on property subject to prior lien, and also held that
personal security was in some cases sufficient. On this last point, while the
earlier cases e.g., Glover v. Glover, McMul. Eq. 153 (S.C. 1841)-sanctioned
such investments if otherwise prudent on the ground that other investments
were difficult to find; the practice was criticized in Nance v. Nance, supra
note 102, and seems to have been definitely discountenanced in Pope v. Matthews, 18 S.C. 444 (1882), except for investments made before the decision in
Nauce.
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self-dealing, direct and indirect, specifying disqualifying degrees
of relationship between the fiduciary and others, and limitations
on adverse interest. 10 5 With these safeguards gone from the
statute, and not replaced by similar restrictions, what, if any,
limitations now exist in the area of self-dealing? The older section dealt with two things: the duty of care, and the duty of
loyalty. The new section deals only with the duty of care, but
the deletion of the old section in its entirety removes all reference to the duty of loyalty. Were or were not the statutory limitations on self-dealing desirable? If they were, should they not
have been retained-or at least detached?
How liberating the new statute will be remains to be seen. The
chances statistically are that a great many trusts, particularly
large ones, are governed by a non-statutory prudent man rule
because of their instrument-granted authority to go outside the
statutes. The new statute, however, may not be an unmixed
blessing. The earlier statute, while it restrained the fiduciary,
also protected him: so long as he followed it, he was absolved
from liability, if he obeyed the terms of the trust and otherwise
exercised reasonable care. He had sharply defined and restricted
standards to follow-especially as to stocks and other corporate
obligations; although he now has flexibility, the line between
the proper and the improper expressed in the general terms of
the hypothetical prudent man may be indistinct if not invisible.
Persons of superior skill-investment counsellors, trust officers
and men of business acumen-may not need the confining
shelter of the old statute; but the non-professional, the nonexpert, can easily go astray if he has only general outlines to
guide him.1 0 6
105. S.C. CODE AxN. § 67-58(5) (1962). It forbids investment in any security of the corporate fiduciary; in any security or obligation in which any corporation, management type investment company or investment trust in which
the fiduciary or other person related to him in the third degree is a director,
officer or employee; in securities or obligations of the same kinds or organizations in which the fiduciary or any person related in the third degree holds
by pledge or otherwise more than five percent of the outstanding capital stock
of the corporation or more than five percent of the shares of the management
type investment company or investment trust; or in any obligation, corporate or
otherwise, secured by a mortgage of real estate is owned in whole or in part
by the individual fiduciary or any person related to him in the third degree, or
where the fiduciary, individual or corporate, is owner by pledge or otherwise
of more than five per cent of the outstanding capital stock of a corporate
mortgagor.
106. Of course, although the new section 67-58 does not say so, the person of
superior skill, actual or represented-in which classification corporate trustees
and their functionaries fall-is held to a higher standard than that of the ordinary
prudent man. One cannot go below the level of the man of ordinary prudence
even though he in fact does not possess that prudence, but another may have
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Section 67-59, which is replaced by the newer section of the
same number, has to do with the sanctioning of investments in
shares of federally insured building or savings and loan associations. The newer section deals with an entirely different matter
-the impermissibility of deviation from the terms of the trust.
Presumably such savings investments, though specifically expunged, may be sanctioned under the prudent man test laid down
in the new section 67-58; and the striking out of the old section
67-59 may reasonably be regarded as not disapproving the same
kind of investments. The older section 67-59, while more precise
in speaking in terms of shares in savings associations, is practically duplicated in the earlier section 67-58, which speaks of
deposits in insured institutions and also speaks elsewhere of
shares; and, as has been pointed out, it is not unreasonable to
assume that there is no legislative intention to treat the securities
there mentioned as no longer proper.
In stating that a fiduciary is not permitted to depart from the
terms of the trust, the new section 67-59 follows the general
common law rule. The fiduciary who deviates from the terms
of the trust cannot escape liability for loss by showing that he
acted as a prudent man and in good faith.'0 7 Particularly is this
so where the trust directs how or what investments are to be
08
made and the trustee invests otherwise.
The earlier section 67-60, replaced by a section with the same
number, deals with obligations of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. The new section 67-60 deals
with the matter of court authorization of deviation. The remarks
with respect to the investments mentioned in the older section
67-59 are appropriate as to the International Bank obligations.
In permitting court-authorized deviation, the new section 67-60
again follows an equity principle: that in order to subserve the
to rise above it. RESTATEMfENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 227, comment c; § 174
(1959). See Epworth Orphanage v. Long, 207 S.C. 384, 36 S.E.2d 37 (1945),
in which the trustee assessed for loss was a highly competent business man.
107. Cothran v. South Carolina Natl Bank, 242 S.C. 80, 130 S.E.2d 177

(1963) ; Rodgers v. Herron, 226 S.C. 317, 85 S.E.2d 104 (1954); Beacham v.
Ross, supra note 102; Dickerson v. Smith, 17 S.C. 289 (1881); Feemster v.
Good, 12 S.C. 573 (1879).
108. Rivers v. Stephenson, 169 S.C. 422, 169 S.E. 135 (1932) ; Bass v. Adams,
163 S.C. 381, 161 S.E. 697 (1931) ; Crayton v. Fowler, 140 S.C. 517, 139 S.E.
161 (1927); Klugh v. Seminole Sec. Co., 103 S.C. 120, 87 S.E. 644 (1915);
Sanders v. Rodgers, 1 S.C. 452 (1869) ; Womack v. Austin, 1 S.C. 421 (1869) ;
Mayer v. Mordecai, supra note 96; Snelling v. McCreary, 14 Rich. Eq. 291
(S.C. 1868).
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interests of the trust, the court will permit deviation under suitable circumstances. 109
The older section 67-61, also replaced by a section with the
same number, permits a fiduciary to retain unauthorized investments received by him as original corpus. The new section 67-61
deals with different matter: the applicability of the statute to
existing as well as to future trusts. The older section, in permitting retention of unauthorized investments, changed earlier nonstatutory law which enjoined upon the fiduciary the duty of disposing, as expeditiously as possible, of assets received by him of
a kind in which he as fiduciary could not invest, 110 subject, of
course, to a contrary manifestation in the instrument creating
the trust. By making express reference to retention, the new
section 67-58 preserves the rule of the older section 67-61.
As indicated, the new section 67-61 makes the substituting act
applicable to both future and existing trusts. Even without such
a provision it is generally held that statutory changes in investment laws are retrospective, and that the propriety of an investment is controlled by the law in force at the time it is made and
not at the time of the creation of the trust."' Since the act
expressly makes its aplication retrospective, no question as to the
legislative intent as to the effective time arises. The constitutional question is, of course, inferentially answered in the rule
just stated, but the cases dealing specifically with the question
where the statute involved has provided for its retrospective
operation have sustained its constitutionality in that respect,
holding that it does not impair the obligations of a contract or
1 12
alter vested rights.
109. The cases are too numerous for listing, but see, e.g., Weston v. Weston,
210 S.C. 1, 41 S.E.2d 372 (1947); Wingard v. Hennessee, 206 S.C. 159, 33
S.E2d 390 (1945) ; Hood v. Cannon, 178 S.C. 94, 182 S.E. 306 (1935) ; Bass v,
Adams, supra note 108.
110. Beacham v. Ross, 187 S.C. 398, 197 S.E. 369 (1938) ; Beacham v. Ross,
190 S.C. 219, 2 S.E.2d 690 (1939) (fiduciary improperly retained stock, then
an unauthorized investment). See Annot., 37 A.L.R. 559 (1925) ; RESTATEMNr
(SECOND), TRUSTS § 230 (1959).
Permission to retain unauthorized investments was first given by statute in
1929, 36 Stat. 143, the predecessor of the old S.C. CODE ANN. § 67-58.
111. 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 227.13 (2d ed. 1956) ; Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 991 (1954).
See it re Willcox, supra note 97 in which a guardian appointed in 1918 held
liable for failing after 1920 to follow requirements of investment statute passed
in that year.
112. Annot. 35 A.L.R.2d 991, 992 (1954). Later cases in the supplement also
support this view.
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H. ControZ of Tmtee
By an act entitled "An Act To Limit The Liability Of A
Fiduciary Under Certain Circumstances" the South Carolina
General Assembly has undertaken to relieve fiduciaries from loss
where investments are made under the reserved or vested direction of others. The act reads:
Whenever a trust instrument reserves unto the trustor or
vests in an advisory or investment committee or in any other
person or persons, including a co-trustee, to the exclusion of
the trustee or to the exclusion of one or more of several
trustees, authority to direct the making or retention of investments or of any investment, the excluded trustee or cotrustee shall be liable, if at all, only as a ministerial agent
and not be liable as trustee or co-trustee from any loss resultof any investment pursuant to such
ing from the making
1 18
authorized direction.
It will be seen that the quoted language ties in, more or less
directly, with the new investment statute discussed in the last
topic, and in a sense is a qualification of it. It is of course well
established that a trustee's powers, either generally or in a particular respect, may be made subject by the trust to the control,
consent or veto of another, whether co-trustee, trustor, beneficiary or other person, as the trust may prescribe ;114 and, narrowly, his investment powers may be so controlled. 1 5 The statute
purports to grant him immunity from liability for loss if he acts
under the authorized direction of the person who holds the power
of control. To an extent it would seem that the statute is a statement of existing law, despite the characterization of ministerial
agent-that is, that he is under no liability to the beneficiary if
in a "directory" or "direction" trust he complies with the direction of the power-holder and may be under liability if he fails
to do so.110 However, even with existing law there seem to be
important qualifications. Much depends on whether the powerholder holds for his sole benefit or whether he holds only for
113. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1965, p. 231, (now designated as S.C. CoDE ANN.

§ 67-63.1 (Supp. 1965).

114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 185 (1959); 2 Sco'rr, TRUSTS § 185
(2d ed. 1956); Neeley v. Peoples Bank, 133 S.C. 43, 130 S.E. 550 (1925);

Best v. Deason, 126 S.C. 116, 119 S.E. 509 (1923).
115. 90 CJ.S. Trusts § 325 (1955); Parkins v. Parkins, 128 S.C. 463, 122
S.E. 492 (1924); Best v. Deason, supra note 114; Mayer v. Mordecai, supra
note 96.
116. PXSTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 185 (1959); 2
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others or for himself and others. "If the power is for the sole
benefit of the person holding the power, the only duty of the
trustee is to ascertain whether the attempted exercise of the
power is or is not within the terms of the trust and act accordingly.""n ' On the other hand, "if the power is for the benefit of
someone other than the holder of the power, the holder of the
power is subject to a fiduciary duty in the exercise of the
power."' 1 8 This means of course that where the power is held
for the benefit of others the holder is subject to fiduciary duties,
failure to exercise which subjects him to liability; and it would
follow that an advisory or investment committee, or other person
holding power of control other than for his sole benefit, could
be subjected to liability for violation of duty-which is the same
duty as that of fiduciaries generally, including the duty of
loyalty and the duty of prudence and care.
But the statute under consideration is directed not to the protection of the holder of the power but to the protection of the
trustee. Independently of statute, the rule seems to be that a
trustee is not absolutely exonerated in following the instructions
of the holder of the power.
He is liable if he shouZd know of the violation of duty. He
is ordinarily under a duty to make reasonable inquiry and
investigation in order to determine whether the holder of the
power is violating his duty. Thus, if it is provided that the
trustee shall make such investments as a third person shall
direct, it is ordinarily the duty of the trustee to make some
investigation into the propriety of the investment, and if
as a result he believes that the holder of the power is abusing
the discretion conferred upon him in directing the investment, he should inform him of this, and if the holder of the
power still insists upon his making the investment, the
trustee should apply to the court for instructions. (emphasis
added.) 119
It is not likely, if an instrument which subjected the trustee
to the directions of another also contained an exculpatory clause,
that the trustee would be absolved of liability in every case in
which he followed the directions of the person having the power
117. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNm), TRUSTS § 185, comment d (1959).
118. Id. at comment e.
119. 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 185 (2d ed. 1956). See also Brennan, Trustee and
Investment Adviser, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 243 (1961) ; Cronin, Effectiveness
of Exculpatory Clauses in Directory Trusts, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1147 (1959).
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to give them.120 In this respect there would seem to be no corollary of departure from the rule that while such immunity clauses,
or limitations of liability, in the trust instrument are valid, they
are not absolutely so and will not relieve the trustee from
breaches of trust committed "in bad faith or intentionally or
21
with reckless indifference to the interest of the beneficiary.'

The preclusion from the exculpating provision of breaches of
trust committed in bad faith, and so on, are based on considerations of public policy. The crucial question is whether the present
statute has created a public policy which will excuse or eliminate
these exceptions. It is obvious that the statute is an exculpatory
statute, but the extent to which it will give immunity to the
trustee who has made investments at the direction of another
becomes a question of ascertaining the legislative intent. It may
reasonably be assumed that acts done in bad faith will not be
condoned, but it is not quite so clear whether the statute will
hold blameless the trustee who is grossly negligent or recklessly
indifferent. Inferentially, just as with an exculpatory clause in
a trust instrument, errors of judgment or failure to exercise
ordinary care and prudence will not penalize the trustee, but it
cannot be said with confidence that the statute will excuse in all
other cases, despite the use of the term "ministerial agent". The
present statute follows in time and also in identical language
statutes in Florida 2 2 and Georgia, 123 which so far appear not to
have been construed. Light from these sources has not yet come.
It may be argued that the statute declares a policy reversing
the implicit public policy restricting the effect of exculpatory
clauses, and that if this were not so the statute would be pointless.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the statute does not
change policy in the area of third-party control but defines and
clarifies existing policy and that its purpose, in the field of
investments, is to afford automatic immunity without the necessity of an exculpating clause-but subject to the same limitations
that such a clause would have.
120. See Cronin supra note 119.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 222 (1959). As to exculpatory provisions generally, see 2 ScoTT TRUSTS § 222 (2d ed. 1956) ; BOGERT, supra note

94, § 542; 90 C.J.S. Trusts, §§ 253b, 335 (1955); 54 Am. Ju. Trusts § 301
(1945); Annot., 83 A.L.R. 616 (1933); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 276 (1945). There
seem to be no South Carolina cases.
122. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 691.04(8) (1943) as inserted by Fla. Laws 1961,
Act, 61-74 at 106.

123. GA. SEss.

LAWS

1964, Act. 732, at 258.
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Even though the excluded trustee is, under the statute, decribed as a "ministerial agent", the term itself may require definition. "Ministerial" may be clear enough as meaning not calling
for the exercise of judgment or discretion,' 24 and accordingly
such an agent, albeit a trustee, would be one not required to exercise judgment or discretion as a trustee must in meeting the
standard of reasonable care and prudence. The question must be
asked also whether "agent" is used in the context of "principal
and agent," and if it is so used, for whom is the excluded trustee
the agent-the directing party, the settlor (which would be
impossible if he were dead, or where the trust was created by
will), or the beneficiary. The reasonable probability is, in this
assumed relationship, that he would be the agent of the holder
of the power. If the holder of the power, as principal, directs
the trustee, as agent, to make or retain an investment which
clearly is grossly improper,--as the trustee-agent knows, has
reason to know or should know-would he not, in making or
retaining such an investment, be committing a wrongful act
for which he would be liable just as any agent committing a
wrongful act at the direction of his principal is liable? He does
not go free because what he did was by order of his superior.
If he is liable on an agency theory, rather than as a trustee,
would the measure of liability be the same?
If the excluded trustee is not to be regarded as an agent in the
usual sense, then the term "ministerial agent" must mean only
that he is acting in a ministerial capacity. Even so, if the direction by the holder of the power-held by him as a fiduciary
because it is for the benefit of others-is on his part a clear
breach of trust which would subject him to liability, would not
the making or retention of the investment pursuant to the direction constitute participation in a breach of trust, and render the
"agent" liable for any loss caused by that breach? 25
124. Blalock v. Johnston, 180 S.C. 40, 185 S.E. 41 (1936)

(defining "min-

isterial" in another context).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

TRUSTS § 326 (1959). By analogy, comment a:
"Similarly, if the trustee purchases through a stockbroker securities which it is

a breach of trust for him to purchase and the broker knows that the purchase

is in breach of trust, the broker is liable for participation in the breach of trust."
The common instance of participation in breach of trust, for which citation of
authority is unnecessary, is the transfer by a trustee in breach of trust to one
'who cannot qualify as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the
transferee becoming a constructive trustee. Another instance is that of misapplication by a trustee of payments made to him by a purchaser who knows
or ought to know of the intended misapplication, e.g., Salinas v. Pearsall, 24
S.C. 179 (1885). Cases of possible participation in breach of trust are common
in connection with deposits of trust funds where the bank may be held liable
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Turning to the co-trustee who may have sole power to direct
investments, it has already been seen that the trust instrument
may properly confer the power upon him. Its effect is to relieve
the other trustee or trustees from activity in which he or they
would otherwise be under a duty to engage and which he or they
could not ordinarily delegate to the co-trustee. 126 The fact, however, that a co-trustee, rather than another, is given the power
does not alter the fiduciary character of his possession of the
power-in fact it is strengthened-nor does that fact render the
responsibility of the excluded trustee any different from what
it would be if the holder of the power were not a co-trustee.
Ordinarily a trustee is not liable for a breach of trust committed
by a co-trustee, but the exceptions are numerous: where he,
(a) participates in a breach of trust committed by his cotrustee; or (b) improperly delegates the administration of
the trust to his co-trustee; or (c) approves or acquiesces in
or conceals a breach of trust committed by his co-trustee;
or (d) by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the administration of the trust has enabled his co-trustee to commit
a breach of trust; or (e) neglects to take proper steps to
127
compel his co-trustee to redress a breach of trust.
for withdrawal or misapplication of funds where there is knowledge of intended breach of trust, e.g., Bourne v. Maryland Casualty Co., 185 S.C. 1, 192

S.E. 605 (1937); Spartanburg County v. Arthur, 169 S.C. 456, 169 S.E. 235
(1932); Charleston Paint Co. v. Exchange Bank, 129 S.C. 290, 123 S.E. 830
1924). Until the passage of the Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary
Security Transfers (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-451 to -462 (1962)) corporations
might be liable for participation in breach of trust in the transfer of stock
registered in a fiduciary's name even without knowledge of the intended breach),
e.g., Magwood v. Railroad Bank, 5 S.C. 379 (1874).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 171 (1959). See, in particular, comment j, and, as to investments, comment h. See also § 184-Duty with Respect
to Co-Trustees: to participate in administration of trust, to use reasonable care
to prevent co-trustee's breach of trust, to compel co-trustee to redress breach of
trust; exception for participation where trust provides otherwise. See also §
194-Several Trustees-requirement of unanimous exercise of power except
where otherwise provided by trust.
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS, § 224 (1959). The South Carolina
cases are substantially in accord, and are generally to the effect that a trustee
is not liable for the improper acts of his co-trustee unless he participated in
them or made them possible. Gibert v. Green, 159 S.C. 135, 156 S.E. 325 (1930) ;
Andrews v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 154 S.C. 456, 153 S.E. 745 (1929);
Broome v. Mordecai, 117 S.C. 195, 108 S.E. 147 (1920); Miller v. Sligh, 10
Rich. Eq. 247 (S.C. 1858) ; Motte v. Schult, 1 Hill's Eq. 146 (S.C. 1833). See
also Epworth Orphanage v. Long, supra note 106, in which wife of settlor and
another were named co-trustees, loss assessed only against latter. The rule
as to co-executors and co-administrators is the same, as to which there are
many cases, e.g., Smith v. Heyward, 115 S.C. 145, 167, 104 S.E. 473, 487 (1920)
in which the following, equally applicable to trustees, is said: "One executor will
not be held liable for the default of another, unless he contributes to it in some
way, by such negligent acts or omission as will warrant the inference that he
countenances, connived at, or acquiesced in, or negligently failed to take steps
to prevent it, after knowledge of the danger of it."
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Of course, as has been seen, there is no problem of delegation
if the trust vests sole power in a co-trustee. If, in addition, the
trust instrument contains an exculpatory provision, there might
be excuse for failure to use reasonable care, which enabled the
co-trustee to commit a breach of trust, but which would not
excuse him, for reasons already seen, for bad faith or reckless
indifference to the interests of the beneficiary. 128 As with other
persons holding power of control, a co-trustee is given exculpatory protection by the statute, and the questions raised as to
the extent and circumstances of that protection are the same, it
would appear, as the questions already raised as they relate to
those others.
L JointZy Owned Securities
The treatment of stock owned jointly by two or more persons
is dealt with in an act which provides:
A corporation may treat as absolute owner of shares or other
securities the survivor or survivors of persons to whom the
same have been or may be issued with the words "as joint
tenants with right of survivorship" or "as joint tenants with
right of survivorship and not as tenants in common" following their names, upon the death of one or more of such
129
persons.
The act deals with the question of ownership from the point
of view of the corporation and is quite plainly designed to afford
protection to the corporation in dealing with the survivor or survivors. It does not indicate that the survivor (or survivors) is,
as related to the estate of the deceased co-owner, to be regarded
as the real owner. In this respect there arises the same question
that occurred in connection with the statutes 130 protecting banks
and savings institutions in payment to the survivor of the payees
of a joint account. In the light of the consideration of these
statutes by the cases of Hawkins v. Thackston,181 and Austin v.
Summers, 3 2 one may reasonably, if not inevitably, conclude that,
even without the present statute, the corporation would be justi128. See Matter of Langdon, 154 Misc. 252, 277 N.Y.S. 581 (1935) ; Cronin,

op. cit. supra note 119.
129. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1965, p. 243, (now designated as S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 12-16.28 (Supp. 1965)).
130. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-171, 8-602 (1962).
131. 224 S.C. 445, 79 S.E2d 714 (1954).

132. 237 S.C. 613, 118 S.E.2d 684 (1961) ; see 14 S.C.L.Q. 228 (1962).
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fled in dealing with the survivor as sole owner and that the
survivor would in reality become the sole beneficial owner. The
statute sets at rest, however, any lingering doubt as to the corporation's position, and to that extent is useful. The cited casesparticularly Austin, in which a savings account ran to A, B or
C,"as joint tenants with right of survivorship"--would seem to
indicate that the survivor or survivors would be entitled not only
to receive the securities issued in the mode mentioned by the
statute but to retain them beneficially.
Although, as has been noted, the present statute does not purport to define the ultimate rights of the named shareholders, it
is valuable also as tending to reinforce the inference which may
be gathered from Austin-if not a clear-cut holding-that despite the statute 33 abolishing the incident of survivorship in
joint tenancies, a joint tenancy and survivorship
may neverthe34
less be created by appropriate language.1

133. S.C.

CODE ANN. § 19-55 (1962).
134. See 14 S.C.L.Q. 228 (1962).
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